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Long-Arm Jurisdiction in California
Under New Section 410.10 of the
Code of Civil Procedure
By JoHN A. GORFINKEL* AND RICHARW A. LAVINE**
I. Introduction
A. Background
Since 1878, when the United States Supreme Court rendered its
classic decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 1 it has been settled law that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment imposes certain con-
stitutional limitations upon the courts of a state in their exercise of
jurisdiction over persons absent from the state. The perennial prob-
lem has been to determine precisely what those limitations are-to
distill specific guidelines from the unspecific "due process" concept.
This problem posed no serious difficulties for Justice Field, who wrote
the majority opinion in Pennoyer. "T]here can be no doubt of [the]
meaning [of the due process clause] when applied to judicial pro-
ceedings," he asserted; in personal actions, due process required that
the defendant "must be brought within the state's jurisdiction by serv-
ice of process within the state, or his voluntary appearance."'2  Thus
* A.B., 1926, J.D., 1929, J.S.D., 1931, University of California, Berkeley;
Member, California Bar.
** A.B., 1939, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1942, LL.M., 1955,
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This article is the combined effort of both authors, who acknowledge their
appreciation to the Editors of The Hastings Law Journal for their editorial efforts in
integrating and supplementing the contributions of each. Because of the nature of
the subject, it was impossible to present the authors' contributions in separate and
distinct sections.
Technical Note: Sections of the California Code of Civil Procedure that have
been repealed by S.B. 503, effective July 1, 1970, have been cited both to the
Code and to the most recent Statutes and Amendments to the Codes of California in
which the text of the particular section appears.
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
2. Id. at 733. Technically, the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff was not based on
the fourteenth amendment since the challenged judgment had been rendered prior
to the adoption of that amendment; however, the case was quickly regarded as establish-
ing a constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts.
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the Court in Pennoyer drew a simple equation between due process
limitations and traditional common law limitations on the acquisition
of in personam jurisdiction: Only if the defendant is personally served
with process while present in the forum state, or if-by general ap-
pearance in the action or by some other means-he voluntarily submits
to the court's jurisdiction, does a state court obtain jurisdiction over an
absent defendant's person.
It is common knowledge, however, that history has not vindicated
Justice Field's certitude concerning due process limitations on the
state courts' in personam jurisdiction over absent individuals. In a
well-known series of subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court gradu-
ally liberalized its restrictive Pennoyer doctrine and lengthened the
list of constitutionally permissible "bases of jurisdiction." In addition
to "presence" and "actual consent," other circumstances-such as the
defendant's domicile within the state, 3 a tort arising out of the de-
fendant's operation of a motor vehicle on the state's highways,4 or the
doing of business by the defendant within the state 5-were deemed
sufficient to warrant a state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
over absent defendants.
Finally, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,6 the Court
adopted a different technique for defining the constitutional boundaries
of a state court's in personam jurisdiction. Rather than add to the list
of specifically described situations held to constitute sufficient bases of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Court announced a broad principle by
which all concrete factual situations could be evaluated. State courts
may exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, it was held,
whenever, under the facts of the particular case, the defendant has
"certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' "'
Like all general principles, the "minimum contacts" doctrine has
the merit of flexibility and the defect of vagueness. In several subse-
quent decisions to be discussed in the following pages, however, the
Supreme Court has attempted some refinement and clarification.
Subject only to the limitations prescribed by the Federal Consti-
tution, a state legislature has the power to determine the extent to which
3. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
4. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
5. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. Id. at 316.
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courts of the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over absent de-
fendants. The common law recognized only two bases of jurisdiction
-presence within the state and actual consent.8  The additional bases
approved in this century by the Supreme Court may be utilized by
state courts only to the extent that state statutes permit.9 Hence, the
states have enacted various types of long-arm statutes, all of which
are designed to extend the in personam jurisdiction of state courts
proportionately with the post-Pennoyer liberalization of federal due
process requirements.
The early long-arm statutes were necessarily of a very limited and
specific character. Nonresident motorist statutes, for instance, em-
powered the courts to take jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
sued on causes of action arising out of their operation of motor vehicles
within the forum state.10 Other statutes conferred jurisdiction over
absent "residents"" or over absent nonresident individuals and foreign
corporations sued on causes of action arising out of business they had
done within the forum state.' 2 After International Shoe opened the
door to a considerable expansion of the constitutional boundaries of
state courts' long-arm jurisdiction, the state legislatures began enact-
ing long-arm statutes considerably more comprehensive in scope.'8
B. California's Long-Arm Statute: New Section 410.10
The California legislature has enacted a long-arm statute that in
terms makes the long-arm jurisdiction of California courts coextensive
with constitutional boundary lines.' 4 New section 410.10 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, which becomes effective July 1, 1970,15 succinctly
states: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."
Thus California, after nearly 100 years of living with a patchwork quilt
of jurisdictional provisions,16 some archaic and others self-limiting,
8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35, comment f at 184
(Proposed Official Draft 1967) [hereinafter cited as SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICTS].
10. See Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Motorists, 32 MICH. L. REv. 325
(1934).
11. E.g., Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052, CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 417
(effective until July 1, 1970); see note 44 and accompanying text infra.
12. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-20 to -21 (1953).
13. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
14. S.B. 503 (1969).
15. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1610, § 30.
16. See Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdiction of California Courts to Render Judgments
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has adopted the most comprehensive long-arm statute of any state. The
advantages of couching the statute in such sweeping language are
obvious. By stating the governing rule solely in terms of constitutional
power, without enumerating specific circumstances under which its
courts may take jurisdiction, California has avoided many problems
of statutory construction that have plagued courts in other states.
17
Against Foreign Corporations and Non-Resident Individuals, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 339
(1958).
For illustrations of the applicability of some of these statutes, see McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (involving CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-
20); Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958)
(construing "doing business" under the provisions of Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, §8 1, 2,
at 343, 345, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 411 (effective until July 1, 1970) ); Turner v.
Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 2d 468, 32 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1963) (involving the "re-
strictive" provisions of Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 417 (effective until July 1, 1970) ).
There is an extensive amount of legal literature on the subject of long-arm
jurisdiction; the following are the most comprehensive discussions of the subject:
Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in
Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause
and the In Personam Jurisdiction of the State Courts, from Pennoyer to Denckla: A
Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569 (1958); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
17. The problems of statutory construction are illustrated by a comparison of the
Illinois decision in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), and the New York decision in Feathers v. McLucas, 15
N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). Both states had statutes authoriz-
ing jurisdiction over a defendant who "commits a tortious act" within the state. In
both cases injury resulted in the forum from an act or omission of the defendant in
another state. The Illinois court held that the tort was committed in Illinois, stating:
"It is well established, however, that in law the place of a wrong is where the last event
takes place which is necessary to render the actor liable. . . . We think it is clear that
the alleged negligence in manufacturing the valve cannot be separated from the resulting
injury; and that for present purposes, like those of liability and limitations, the tort was
committed in Illinois." 22 Ill. 2d at 435-36, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63. The New York
court held that no tort was committed in New York, stating: "The tortious act charged
against the appellant-that it improperly designed and assembled the tank--indis-
putably occurred in the out-of-state manufacturing process in Kansas.
... The mere occurrence of the injury in this State certainly cannot serve to
transmute an out-of-state tortious act into one committed here within the sense of the
statutory wording." 15 N.Y.2d at 459-60, 209 N.E.2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21.
Following this decision, New York amended its statute, section 302 of the Civil Practice
Act, to cover such cases. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1969).
It should also be noted, on the issue of statutory construction, that in the Gray
case defendant suggested a distinction between "tort" and "tortious act," arguing that
"instead of using the word 'tort,' the legislature employed the term 'tortious act,'
and that the latter refers only to the act or conduct, separate and apart from any conse-
quences thereof." 22 Ill. 2d at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763. The Illinois court did not agree
with that argument, treating "tort" and "tortious act" as synonymous, at least for the
purposes of the jurisdictional statute. Id. at 436-37, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
[Vol. 211166
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There will be no need, under the new statute, for the two-step analysis
of first determining whether the contemplated exercise of jurisdiction
is within the legislative mandate, and then considering whether, if exer-
cised, it is within the constitutional limits permitted by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, section 410.10 will
not have any of the unduly limiting effects of a long-arm statute that
identifies specific factual situations as bases of jurisdiction. Hence-
forth, California will not find itself in the position of other states whose
statutes 8 prevent their courts from taking advantage of the full sweep
of the minimum contacts doctrine.
Although section 410.10 will solve some old problems, it will
create some new ones. In order to omit all statutory restrictions, it was
necessary to omit also any language of definition or clarification. 9
Since the legislature has extended California's long-arm jurisdiction
to the outermost limits of the due process clause, California courts will
constantly be called upon to confront problems of constitutional mag-
nitude-problems that other states have avoided by inserting self-limit-
ing provisions in their long-arm statutes.
20
The principal problems under section 410.10 will arise in cases
where jurisdiction is asserted over a defendant served with process out-
side California and is predicated on his status, his activities within the
state, or his conduct outside the state causing an effect inside the state.
This is a developing field in which the law is far from settled. Because
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is involved, the
United States Supreme Court is, of course, the final arbiter. Its deci-
sions since International Shoe in 1945, however, have been few,21 and
the most recent of any significiance, Hanson v. Denckla,22 was handed
down in 1958. Since that date, the determination of what due process
requires in jurisdictional matters-the task of applying and refining the
minimum contacts principle-has been left to the state courts and the
Compare the similar problem in the application of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964), which makes liability depend upon "the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred." Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962);
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
18. 'E.g., OHIo REV. CoDE ANN. § 2307.382 (Page-Supp. 1969); N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAw § 302 (McKinney 1969).
19. Compare the detail in the Wisconsin statute, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05
(Supp. 1969), and the Proposed Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act,
9B UNIFORM L. ANN. (1966), in 11 AM. J. CoMz. L. 415-36 (1962).
20. This is especially true of New York; see Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443,
209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965), discussed in note 17 supra.
21. See notes 76-82 infra.
22. 357 U.S. 255 (1958).
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lower federal courts. From their decisions some suggested guidelines
have emerged, but these are only tentative. For the time being, the
only safe conclusion is that expressed by one commentator on the In-
ternational Shoe case: "[A]lthough old dogma has been destroyed,
new doctrine to replace it has not been firmly fashioned."23
In spite of this lack of any very definite guidance in the form of
Supreme Court decisions, the California courts will not find themselves
in a trackless wilderness when they begin construing and applying new
section 410.10. In addition to the decisions from other states and from
the lower federal courts, certain prior California decisions will prove
helpful in some instances. Especially relevant is the line of cases, com-
mencing in 1958 with Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court,2" dealing
with the permissible extent of jurisdiction over foreign corporations
under old section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes
service of process on such corporations "doing business" in this state.
2 5
The Supreme Court of California held in the Jahn case that "whatever
limitations [section 411] imposes are equivalent to those of the due
process clause."' 26  Accordingly, with respect to foreign corporations,
section 410.10 merely continues the law established by the Jahn case.
Thus, judicial interpretations of the minimum contacts rule in cases
arising under old section 411 should serve as guideposts in deciding
questions that will arise under new section 410.10. Nevertheless, a
word of caution is in order. The appellate court decisions under section
411 have not been wholly consistent.2" Some judicial determinations
that jurisdiction did not exist in particular cases under section 411 may
well have been predicated on an interpretation of the minimum con-
tacts principle that was narrower than actually required by the due
process clause.2 8
23. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts, From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CI. L. REV.
569, 623 (1958).
24. 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 438 (1958).
25. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, at 343, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 411 (effec-
tive until July 1, 1970).
26. Id. at 858, 323 P.2d at 439.
27. Compare A.R. Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 328, 335-36,
73 Cal. Rptr. 920, 924-25 (1968), with Leach Co. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. App. 2d
493, 72 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1968), and Yeck Mfg. Corp. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App.
2d 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1962). See note 123 and text accompanying notes 147-51
infra.
28. E.g., Leach Co. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. App. 2d 493, 72 Cal. Rptr. 216
(1968); Gill v. Surgitool Inc., 256 Cal. App. 2d 583, 64 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1967);
Yeck Mfg. Corp. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 2d 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1962).
The mechanical approach used in Gill and Yeck for determining the existence of long-
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Prior California cases holding that jurisdiction was not authorized
under old section 417 of the Code of Civil Procedure 29 will for the most
part be irrelevant to cases arising under the new statute. Section 417
limited long-arm jurisdiction over individuals to cases where the de-
fendant was a domiciliary at the time the cause of action arose, or the
action was commenced or the process served.30 Section 410.10 repudi-
ates the self-imposed restrictions of section 417 and authorizes an en-
tirely new approach to the matter. 1
In the hope of assisting in understanding the issues and furnishing
some guide to an analysis, if not a solution, of the problems that will
arise under section 410.10, this article, after a brief, selective review of
the constitutional bases of jursidiction, will consider in some detail
the potential reach of the new statute in the main areas of civil litigation.
C. Matters Not Considered
In order to keep the discussion within reasonable bounds, it should
be made clear at the outset that certain matters fall outside the scope of
the paper and will thus be either assumed or omitted.
1. Only in personam jurisdiction will be considered, i.e., the
power of a court, consistent with the due process clause, to render a
judgment that is final and binding on all the parties and those in privity
with them and that is further entitled to full faith and credit if sued on
in another state for the purpose of there enforcing it against the original
defendant. The extent to which a court may reach property in the
state, belonging to an absent defendant, and subject that property to the
plaintiff's claims, will not be considered. 2
2. The only jurisdiction issue that will be considered is whether
the court has constitutional power to act; the subordinate issue of
whether other considerations, such as forum non conveniens, may or
should cause the court to decline to act will not be discussed.
33
arm jurisdiction was expressly disapproved in Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court,
71 A.C. 933, 943, 458 P.2d 57, 65, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 121 (1969).
29. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052, CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 417 (effective
until July 1, 1970).
30. See note 44 and accompanying text infra.
31. For a consideration of the background on section 417 and its role as limiting
the jurisdiction of California courts, see 40 CALIF. L. REv. 156, 158 (1952); 23 CAL.
ST. B.J. 196 (1948). See also Martens v. Winder, 341 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1965).
32. For a discussion of the effect of the new California long-arm statute on in
rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, see Green, Jurisdictional Reform in California, 21
HASTINGs L.J. - (1970).
33. California has codified the doctrine of forum non conveniens. CAL. CODE
May 19701
3. It is assumed in all cases that the court is competent in the
sense of having subject matter jurisdiction both under the division of
judicial power between federal and state courts and under the provisions
of the California Constitution and statutes apportioning judicial business
within the California court system.
4. It is assumed that the statutory provisions for service of proc-
ess have been complied with and the defendant has received reason-
able notice and been given adequate opportunity to appear and de-
fend. 4
5. It is assumed that there is no distinction between the jurisdic-
tional reach of a state court and of a federal court sitting in the state in
a diversity case.35 Accordingly, cases from federal courts involving
long-arm statutes will be considered as fully relevant to a discussion of
state court power under like circumstances.
II. Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction
In considering the matter of the constitutional bases of jurisdic-
tion, it is suggested that four general sources exist:36 (1) personal
service of process on a defendant while he is physically present within
the forum; (2) defendant's voluntary submission to the courts of the
forum, either by his consent in advance or his "general appearance" in
the action; (3) the existence of a status relationship, as a citizen,
national or resident of, or person owing allegiance to, the forum; (4)
some activity of the defendant in, or affecting persons or property in,
the forum.
CIV. PROC. § 410.30 (operative July 1, 1970). For a discussion of this new statute, see
Note, Forum Non Conveniens in California, 21 HASTINGS L.J. - (1970).
34. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City
of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950). For analysis of the new California statutory provisions on
service of process, see Note, Substituted Service of Process on Individuals: Code of
Civil Procedure Section 415.20(b), 21 Hastings L.J. - (1970); Note, Service by Mail
Provisions of California's New Jurisdiction Statute, 21 Hastings L.J. - (1970).
35. See Martens v. Winder, 341 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1965) (considering the
interaction of old Code of Civil Procedure section 417 and Federal Rule 4(e) ).
36. See CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 1969 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR
AND THE LEGISLATURE, app. II [hereinafter cited as 1969 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT],
which lists 11 bases: "(1) Presence; (2) Domicil; (3) Residence; (4) Nationality or
citizenship; (5) Consent; (6) Appearance in an action; (7) Doing business in the
state; (8) An act done in the state; (9) Causing an effect in the state by an act
done elsewhere; (10) Ownership, use or possession of a thing in the state; (11) Other
relationships to the state which make the exercise of judicial jurisdiction reasonable."
Id. at 71. These eleven are, in this article, regrouped by including 2, 3 and 4 under
the single heading of "status," 5 and 6 under the single heading of "consent" and the
remainder, 7 through 11, under the single heading of "activity."
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A. Physical Presence Within the Forum State
As stated previously, questions concerning the sufficiency of the
service of process upon a defendant are outside the scope of this dis-
cussion, even though such questions are properly termed "jurisdictional"
in the sense that the court cannot render a valid judgment against a
defendant whenever service was so defective as to deprive him of ade-
quate notice of the proceedings. But the physical act of delivering
process personally to the defendant in the forum is not a source of the
court's jurisdiction over him; and it is with the sources or bases of juris-
diction that this discussion is primarily concerned.
The general proposition that service of process is not a "source"
or "basis" of in personam jurisdiction is subject to one important and
long-established exception: The personal service of process on a de-
fendant physically present in the state, no matter how transient or tem-
porary that presence may be, has consistently been held sufficient as a
basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.37 This particular
basis of jurisdiction is frequently-and justly-criticized.38  It rests on
the untenable theory that "the foundation of jurisdiction is physical
power."3 9  Moreover, it often operates inequitably: a nonresident de-
fendant served with process during a five minute sojourn in the forum
state can be forced to return there to defend a suit having no relation-
ship whatever to that state. Notwithstanding these grave difficulties,
''service upon a defendant while physically present" continues to be a
constitutionally acceptable basis of jurisdiction. Hence it will pre-
sumably remain acceptable in California under section 410.10, although
application of forum non conveniens may be sought to diminish the
harshness of an otherwise valid service of process.
B. Consent
As noted previously, consent-actual or implied-is one of the
37. When the defendant is truly a transient and the cause of action does not
arise out of any act or activity in or affecting persons or property in the forum, ad-
judicatory power rests solely on the assertion of physical control over the person of the
defendant. This is symbolized by the act of service, akin to the common law writ of
capias ad respondendum. "A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an
individual who is physically present within its territory, whether permanently or tem-
porarily, if at that time he is properly served with process." 1969 JUDICIAL COUNCIL
REPORT at 71 (emphasis added).
38. A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAwS 103-07 (1962);
EHRENZWEIG, The Transient Rule of Person Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Schlesinger, Methods of Progress in
Conflict of Laws-Some Comments on Ehrenzweig's Treatment of "Transient" Juris-
diction, 9 J. PUB. L. 313, 317-18 (1960).
39. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1916).
May 1970]
traditional common law bases of jurisdiction. From Pennoyer to the
present day it has been recognized as satisfying the requirements of the
due process clause. A fortiori, "consent" will continue to be a sufficient
basis of jurisdiction in California under section 410. 10
In the great majority of tort cases, the only consent likely to be
involved is the consent implied by a defendant's general appearance in
the action. In contract cases, on the other hand, consent will from time
to time be invoked as a basis of jurisdiction under circumstances that
may raise considerable doubt as to the fairness and propriety of sub-
jecting an absent defendant to the jurisdiction of a California court.
The problem is best brought into focus by considering a concrete case.
Assume that the parties to a contract have stipulated that disputes arising
thereunder will be adjudicated by the appropriate California court.
Pursuant to this stipulation, each party-assuming that both are non-
residents-appoints an agent in California to accept service of process
in any action arising out of the contract. And assume in addition that
there are no other contacts with the state of California-that neither
party resides in California, and that the contract was made and was to
be performed elsewhere. The United States Supreme Court's decision
in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent ' 0 appears to authorize
the California court's exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident de-
fendant in such a case, provided that other due process requirements-
such as that the defendant receive reasonable notice of the proceedings
-are fulfilled. The only difference between the facts of Szukhent and
the facts of the preceding hypothetical is that the plaintiff in Szukhent
was a resident of New York, the forum state.
Cases of the Szukhent variety present two major difficulties. First
of all, since the defendant has had no real contact with the forum state,
the exercise of jurisdiction is seemingly questionable under the rule of
International Shoe. Secondly, even if the defendant's "consent" is
thought to obviate the need for any minimum contacts, the question
often remains whether the defendant has really consented to the forum
state's jurisdiction in any meaningful sense. This is because most con-
tractual provisions appointing agents to accept service-or waiving
service-are contained in "adhesion" contracts between parties pos-
sessed of greatly disparate bargaining power.4 The provision for ap-
pointment or waiver invariably works to the disadvantage of the weaker
party, who in the typical case is either ignorant of the provision's import
40. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
41. It is apparent from one of the dissenting opinions in Szukhent that the con-
tract involved in that case was of the "adhesion" variety. Id. at 326.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
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or forced to accept it. Accordingly, in contract cases where the sole
basis of jurisdiction is "consent" inferred from a clause in the contract
by which a nonresident defendant either appointed an agent in Cali-
fornia or waived service in any action in California, it is suggested that
the court should take the utmost care to ascertain whether the de-
fendant fully understood the import of such a provision when he exe-
cuted the contract. 2 A lack of full understanding on the defendant's
part, together with the lack of any minimum contacts between the de-
fendant and the state of California, should be held to preclude the Cali-
fornia court's exercise of jurisdiction.
C. Status-Domicile and Residence
The defendant's status as a citizen, domiciliary, resident, or na-
tional of, or person owing allegiance to the forum, may furnish the basis
for adjudicatory power over him.4 3 Old section 417 provided for in
personam jurisdiction if the defendant was a "resident" of California at
certain specified times; "resident" as used therein was interpreted as
"domiciliary." 44  Although neither the United States Supreme Court
nor the Supreme Court of California has ever clearly ruled on the
question, there is respectable authority that "residence," as distinguished
from "domicile," may furnish a proper basis for the exercise of juris-
diction. 5
Our concern at this point is to determine the conditions under
which jurisdiction may be taken when the defendant's status is the sole
basis for the assertion of jurisdiction. Throughout this subsection,
42. "Heretofore, judicial good common sense has, on one ground or another,
disregarded contractual provisions like this one, not encouraged them. It is a long trip
from San Francisco--or from Honolulu or Anchorage-to New York, Boston, or
Wilmington. And the trip can be very expensive, often costing more than it would
simply to pay what is demanded. The very threat of such a suit can be used to
force payment of alleged claims, even though they be wholly without merit. This fact
will not be news to companies exerting their economic power to wangle such con-
tracts. No statute and no rule requires this Court to place its imprimatur upon them.
I would not." Id. at 329 (Black, J., dissenting).
43. See generally 1969 JUDIcIAL CoUNcIL REPORT, app. II, at 72-74. On the
matter of allegiance, as distinct from nationality or citizenship, see the historic English
case of Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 347.
44. Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953), is frequently
cited as the basis for this interpretation, but it appears that Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d
235, 288 P.2d 497 (1955), citing some ambiguous language in Allen, is the real origin.
See 45 Cal. 2d at 242, 288 P.2d at 500-01; Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822,
827, 345 P.2d 921, 922 (1959); Soule v. Soule, 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 445, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 417, 418 (1961).
45. SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 30.
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therefore, we must exclude from consideration any situations in which
any element of the cause of action arises, or the defendant is served,
within the state since, then, there is usually a sufficient basis of juris-
diction over the defendant regardless of his status. And, of course,
we must assume that at some point during the period of time ex-
tending from immediately prior to the liability-creating tort or breach
of contract until the moment of actual service of process, the defendant
was linked to the forum by some tie of citizenship, domicile, residence
or allegiance.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that citizen-
ship is a proper basis for jurisdiction over an absent national when a
federal claim is asserted in a federal tribunal.4 6  In 1940, in Milliken
v. Meyer, 7 the Court for the first time sustained a state court's asser-
tion of jurisdiction over an absent citizen of the forum. Following the
Milliken decision, in order to restrict48 the jurisdiction of California
courts over absent defendants, California adopted section 417 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which, in substance, provided that personal
jurisdiction could be assumed over an individual defendant only if he
was personally served with process and was a "resident" of the state
when the action was commenced or when process was served upon
him.
4 9
Most, if not all, of the cases in which jursidiction was found to
exist under section 417 involved activity of the defendant while he was
physically present within the state.5 ° In these cases, jurisdiction is con-
stitutionally supportable without regard to the residence or domicile of
the defendant.5 ' They cannot be used as authority to support a con-
46. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
47. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
48. See note 31 supra.
49. Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 935, § 1, at 2537. Section 417 was amended in 1957
by adding that jurisdiction could be assumed if defendant was a "resident" at the time
the cause of action arose. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052.
50. In Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 307, 259 P.2d 905 (1953), and
Myrick v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 519, 261 P.2d 255 (1953), the actions were for
injuries arising out of automobile collisions in California; this is stated in the report of
the Allen case, 41 Cal. 2d at 308, 259 P.2d at 906, and in the opinion of the district
court of appeal, subsequently vacated by the California Supreme Court's grant of hear-
ing, in the Myrick case in 256 P.2d at 349. In Owens v. Superior Court, 52
Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959), the action was for injuries resulting from a dog
bite. The tort was committed in California while the defendant, owner of the dog,
was a resident of California.
51. Under the decision in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the California
court could have taken jurisdiction in Myrick and Allen if the defendant motorists had
been nonresidents; it would have been paradoxical if jurisdiction could not be obtained
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stitutional basis for jurisdiction in a case in which the claim does not
arise out of and is unrelated to the defendant's presence or activity in
California.52
In determining the permissible scope of jurisdiction based on the
defendant's status, two separate problems arise: exactly what status is
required, and when must that status exist. For state purposes,5 3 the
first problem arises out of the distinction between citizenship or domi-
cile 4 and residence.
All the authorities agree that, although factually domicile and resi-
dence are usually indistinguishable and a person's residence is normally
also his domicile, legally they are separate and distinguishable con-
cepts.55 Domicile is the place where a person maintains his home. 56
He may, by virtue of a temporary assignment, reside in one state while
retaining his former domicile.57  Or he may maintain two or more
abodes in different states, residing in each for part of the year; and
while each such abode is, for the time being, his residence, only one will
be his domicile.58  However, different courts may reach different con-
clusions as to which abode is, in fact, his domicile.59
Under the Milliken decision, status as a domiciliary-citizen at the
merely because the defendant motorists were residents of the state.
52. But see 1969 JUDICIAL COUNcIL REPORT, app. 11, at 73, citing Myrick v.
Superior Court, 256 P.2d 348, 353 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953). Since the opinion in
Myrick was vacated it cannot be cited as authority and the general statements in that
portion of the Judicial Council Report must be taken with caution. See note 50 supra.
53. A person may be a citizen or national of the United States without residing
or being domiciled therein. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932);
Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924). A person may owe allegiance to a national
state without being a citizen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1408 (1964), or national, see Joyce v.
Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 347, of that state. Since these distinctions
do not apply to the states, they are not considered here.
54. A citizen of the United States is a citizen of the state wherein he is domi-
ciled; except in the case of the domiciled alien, there is no distinction between state
citizenship and state domicile. See SEcOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICS § 31, Re-
porters Notes.
55. See generally 1969 JUDICIAL CouNcIL REPORT, app. II, at 72-73; SECOND
RETATEMENT OF CONFLIcTS § 11, comment k at 58-59.
56. "To acquire a domicil of choice in a place, a person must intend, for the time
at least, to make that place his home." SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFUcTS § 18.
57. See District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441 (1941).
58. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939). The classic illustration is the case
of Dr. John T. Dorrance. See In re Estate of Dorrance, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601
(Prerogative Ct. 1934), affd, 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 A. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935), alP'd,
116 N.J.L. 362, 184 A. 743 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1937);
In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 617 (1932).
59. Compare In re Estate of Dorrance, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601 (Preroga-
tive Ct. 1934), with In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932).
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moment of service is clearly sufficient to support jurisdiction. 0 The
question is whether status as "resident" will equally support jurisdiction.
Whether residence will be sufficient status to support jurisdiction
may well depend upon what is meant by "residence." If it means a
fixed or settled place of abode for a substantial period of time, as
distinguished from the transient presence of a traveller passing through
and only temporarily sojourning, it would seem that such residence
should be a constitutionally permissible basis for jurisdiction.61 Justi-
fication would lie in the fact that the benefits afforded by the state to
such a "resident" are sufficiently substantial and long standing to
justify a state in demanding the reciprocal obligation of responding to
its judicial process. If the residence is merely temporary or transient,
however, it should not suffice unless process is actually served on the
defendant personally while he is within the state. If service is effected
only after the defendant has departed from the state, his temporary
residence at some past time seems too tenuous to support a claim of
jurisdiction.
Section 417, as amended, made "residence" a basis for jurisdiction
at any one of three points in time: when the cause of action arose,
when the action was commenced, or when process was served.62 Since
most of the cases involved causes of action arising in California and de-
fendants who were residents when the cause of action arose, little
critical attention was paid to whether residence at the time the action
was commenced or at the time process was served would properly
support jurisdiction.
(1) Status at the Time the Cause of Action Arose
The defendant's status at the time the cause of action arose, with-
out any other contact with the forum, would appear to be a doubtful
basis for jurisdiction. Although old section 417 authorizes jurisdiction
60. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). "Domicile in the state is alone
sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for
purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service." Id.
at 462.
61. This is the view adopted by the Judicial Council Report. 1969 JtDICIAL
COUNCIL REPORT, app. II, at 73. This position is not, however, supported by any
California case. The reference in the Judicial Council Report to Myrick v. Superior
Court is to an opinion in the district court of appeal which was vacated by grant of
hearing by the California Supreme Court and therefore not good authority. See note
50 supra. The California Supreme Court has consistently held that "resident" as used
in section 417, means "domicilliary." See, e.g., cases cited note 44 supra.
62. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
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where the defendant was a resident when the cause of action arose,
no California case has been found in which such a residence or
domicile at that time was the sole basis for jurisdiction. 3  Indeed, a
dictum in Owens v. Superior Courts4 suggests that it may not be a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction.
In contract actions it is possible to argue that defendant's rela-
tionship to a particular state at the time the contract was made or
performance thereunder was due gives that state the requisite interest
and that therefore maintenance of the suit there will not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play."'6 5
In tort actions, it seems less likely that such jurisdiction is justi-
fiable where the cause of action arose outside the state and the defend-
ant's conduct in no way impinged upon or affected persons or property
within the forum.60 To pose an extreme case, assume that the defend-
ant, a domiciliary of California while en route to a new home in New
York, injures plaintiff in Colorado. Since, at the time of injury, de-
fendant had not reached his destination, his domicile was still in Cali-
fornia. 7 But if, prior to the commencement of the action, he had
reached New York and there established a new domicile, there would be
no relationship linking him to California at the time the action was com-
63. "It has been held that a state under certain circumstances has jurisdiction
over a defendant who is domiciled in the state at the time when the cause of action
arose . . . ." 1969 JUDIcLAL CoUNCIL REPORT, app. If, at 72, citing Owens v. Superior
Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 829, 345 P.2d 921, 923 (1959). The Owens decision does
not support the statement. The defendant committed the tort in California; also, the
court expressly questioned past domicile as a basis for jurisdiction, unless the cause of
action was related to that domicile: "We agree with defendant, however, that the mere
fact of past domicile in the state would not subject him to its jurisdiction indefinitely,
for a past domicile having no relationship to the litigation at hand would not afford a
reasonable basis for an assertion of jurisdiction.
". .. [It may be debatable whether [jurisdiction based on residence at the time
the cause of action arose] can constitutionally be assumed in the absence of some other
relevant contacts with the state. If, for example, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
were presently domiciled here and the cause of action arose out of the defendant's ac-
tivities elsewhere, the fact standing alone that the defendant was domiciled here at the
time the cause of action arose might be too tenuous a basis for asserting jurisdiction
over him." 52 Cal. 2d at 829, 345 P.2d at 923-24 (emphasis added).
64. 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959); see note 63 supra.
65. See text accompanying notes 200-214 infra.
66. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941), recognizing that there may be
circumstances under which a state has sufficient interest or concern to punish one of
its citizens for an act committed outside the state's territorial limits and not directly
injuring a person or property within the state.
67. Alvord & Alvord v. Patenotre, 196 Misc. 524, 92 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct,
1949); SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 19, comment a at 99. "A domicile once
established continues until it is superseded by a new domicile." Id. § 19.
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menced and no reason why California should or should be permitted to,
assume jurisdiction.68
(2) Status at the Time the Action Was Commenced
The defendant's status at the time the action was commenced
should be a sound basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, both practically
and theoretically. Practically, the traditional view has been that the
plaintiff had to seek out the defendant and sue him on his own home
ground. If the plaintiff does so and files suit in defendant's forum, de-
fendant should not be permitted to render that act a nullity by shifting
his base before he can be served with process. 69 Theoretically, the filing
of the action is the invocation of the state's adjudicatory power; if, at
that time, an appropriate relationship exists, the state's jurisdiction over
the defendant should immediately attach, subject only to the require-
ment that he be given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.
(3) Status at the Time Process Was Served
All the considerations that support jurisdiction if the requisite
status existed at the time the action was commenced, apply with equal
force if the status exists at the time process is served.
D. Activity
The greatest changes wrought by section 410.10, as well as the
principal problems in its application, will become apparent in cases
where the defendant at all relevant times was a nonresident, nondomi-
ciliary of California, was served with process outside California, and
has not appeared or otherwise voluntarily submitted to jurisdiction. It
has long been recognized that a foreign corporation might subject itself
to the jurisdiction of a state other than the state of its incorporation or
principal place of business by engaging in activity therein.70 As formu-
lated after the turn of the century, this doctrine required that the ac-
68. See Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 829, 345 P.2d 921, 923-24,
(1959); see note 63 supra.
69. "Defendant contends that since amenability to suit is a responsibility
growing out of domicile in the state, it ceases when such domicile ceases. In the
Allen case we held, however, that it did not cease if the action was commenced before
the defendant changed his domicile to another state .... Such jurisdiction is justi-
fied by the plaintiff's interest in being able to conduct his litigation on the basis of the
facts existing at the time he must act. He must file his action where jurisdiction over
the defendant may be obtained." Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 829, 345
P.2d 921, 923 (1959).
70. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
CALIFORNIA LONG-ARM JURISDICTION
tivity be regular, continuous and substantial so that the corporation
could be regarded as "present" and "doing business" in the forum.7'
The first recognition that certain types of activity might be suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction over individuals was in the case of Hess v.
Pawloski, decided in 1927.72 That decision sustained a state statute
authorizing jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist served with process
outside the forum, when the cause of action arose out of the motorist's
use of the highway in the forum. The rationale first advanced for the
doctrine was the fiction that the motorist, by using the highway, had
either expressly or impliedly consented to such jurisdiction.7" Eventu-
ally it was recognized that this purported rationale was a fiction 74 and
the doctrine was placed on the sounder basis that a state had the power
to hold a person amenable to the jurisdiction of its courts in an action
arising out of his tortious conduct in the forum.
75
In 1945, the United States Supreme Court decided International
Shoe Co. v. Washington76 and thereby laid the foundation for the
current development of long-arm statutes, predicating jurisdiction on
the defendant's activities or minimum "contacts" with the forum. The
claim in International Shoe was by the State of Washington to recover
contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund. It was
conceded that the activities of the corporation in the state were not
sufficient to constitute "presence" or "doing business" in the traditional
sense. Nevertheless, the Court sustained the power of the Washington
courts on the theory that the claim arose out of activities of Interna-
tional Shoe's salesmen in the state and that this was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction for the purposes of the particular suit. The essence of the
holding and the reasons therefor are summed up in the following ex-
tract from the opinion:
71. For the problems raised by attempts to define these terms, see Hutchinson
v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.).
72. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
73. Id. at 356.
74. Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953). "It is true that in
order to ease the process by which new decisions are fitted into pre-existing modes of
analysis there has been some fictive talk to the effect that the reason why a non-
resident can be subjected to a state's jurisdiction is that the non-resident has 'impliedly'
consented to be sued there. In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in these cases does
not rest on consent at all. See [Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-resident Motorists, 39
HI v. L. REv. 563 (1926)]. The defendant may protest to high heaven his unwilling-
ness to be sued and it avails him not. The liability rests on the inroad which the au-
tomobile has made on the decision of [Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)] as
it has on so many aspects of our social scene." 346 U.S. at 340-41.
75. &'ee A. EHmmNZwEIG, A TPEATxsn ON THE CONFUCT OF LAws 96-98 (1962).
76. W6 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in per-
sonam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's
person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a
court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally
binding him. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given
way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."'77
Later in the opinion, the Court stated that the demands of due process
"may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the
forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there.
78
Since the International Shoe decision, the United States Supreme
Court has rendered four decisions which shed some light on the scope
and implications of the minimum contacts doctrine, Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia79 in 1950, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co."° in 1952, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co."' in 1957
and Hanson v. Denckla82 in 1958. From these decisions three proposi-
tions emerge as clearly settled and relevant in the application of the
activity concept. The first of these propositions is that although the
International Shoe case was concerned with and spoke of corporations, it
is not limited to corporations. The minimum contacts doctrine applies
to individuals and partnerships as well as corporations; no subsequent
case has doubted this extension.83 The second proposition is that when
the minimum contacts doctrine is invoked as the sole basis for juris-
diction the claim sued on must arise out of those contacts of the defend-
ant with the forum that are asserted as furnishing the jurisdictional
basis.84 The third proposition is that the minimum contacts doctrine
has supplemented, not superseded, the earlier concepts of "presence"
and "doing business' and the latter still possesses vitality, with the signifi-
cant difference stated thus: If "presence" or "doing business" is the
77. Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 317.
79. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
80. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
81. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
82. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
83. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 845.
84. See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra. See also Fisher Governor Co. v.
Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959).
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basis for jurisdiction, the claim sued on does not have to arise out of
activities in the forum state but may, in fact, be wholly unrelated to
those activities.8 5
Unfortunately, these areas of certainty are only a small part of
the entire picture; large areas of uncertainty still exist in determining
what activities constitute minimum contacts. International Shoe did
no more than state a principle in general and vague language, and
while it pointed out the direction in which the law should develop, it
did not define the boundaries of that development. None of the subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions has been particularly helpful in furnish-
ing guides; and in the main, the role of interpreting and exploring the
minimum contacts doctrine has been left to the state courts.
Interpreting and exploring the vague contours of the minimum
contacts doctrine will be the essential task of the California courts when
they are called upon to apply section 410.10. Whatever uncertainties
inhere in the minimum contacts concept inhere also in the new Cali-
fornia statute. In order to minimize at least some of the uncertainty,
and to predict in concrete terms the impact of section 410.10, the re-
naining portion of this essay is devoted to a discussion of specific
factual situations likely to arise in the two main categories of civil liti-
gation-torts and contracts. The central unifying purpose of the entire
discussion is to provide answers to a single question that will recur
in many different kinds of cases: What factual situations satisfy the
minimum contacts requirement, and thus enable California courts to
exercise long-arm jurisdiction under section 410.10?
1II. Torts and Minimum Contacts
The scope of the minimum contacts doctrine-and hence the
scope of section 410.10-in tort actions against absent defendants
will be explored by treating separately the cases involving three distinct
groups of torts. The first of the ensuing subsections concerns inten-
tional tort and negligence cases in which both the defendant's tortious
85. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Brunzell
Constr. Co. v. Harrah's Club, 225 Cal. App. 2d 734, 37 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1964).
"[UInless the defendant's forum-related activity reaches such extensive or wide-ranging
proportions as to make the defendant sufficiently 'present' in the forum state to sup-
port jurisdiction over it concerning causes of action which are unrelated to that ac-
tivity (Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court . . . 53 Cal. 2d 222, 225, 1 Cal. Rptr.
1, 347 P.2d 1, and authorities cited therein), the particular cause of action must arise
out of or be connected with the defendants forum related activity." Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court, 71 A.C. 933, 938-39, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118
(1969).
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conduct and the plaintiff's resulting injury occur in the forum state.
Next come the cases-primarily products liability cases-in which the
plaintiff is injured in the forum state by the defendant's conduct out-
side the state. The final subsection deals with other types of torts and
calls particular attention to some special problems presented by ac-
tions for defamation and invasion of privacy.
A. Conduct and Harm in the Forum-Intentional Torts and Negligence
All the decisions seem to support the conclusion that a constitu-
tional basis for jurisdiction exists when the defendant, personally,
or by agent, commits an act in the forum giving rise to a tort claim,
even though that act occurs during a single, isolated entry into the
state.8
The historic situation is that of the nonresident motorist, and now
that it is clearly recognized that the basis for jurisdiction transcends the
the original "consent" fiction, the nonresident motorist decisions sup-
port the proposition stated above.81 In addition to the nonresident
motorist cases, there are several instances in which isolated activity in
the forum has been held sufficient to support jurisdiction. The most
significant case is McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,8 in
which the United States Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of the
California courts in an action on an insurance policy. The entire
transaction had been handled by mail and, so far as appeared, was the
only activity of the defendant company in California or with a Cali-
fornia resident. The opinion succinctly states: "It is sufficient for pur-
poses of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had
substantial connection with the State [citing, among other cases, Hess
v. Pawloski].89
86. "In cases under these statutes in state and federal courts, jurisdiction on the
basis of a single tort has been uniformly upheld: 'Indeed, the constitutionality of this
assertion of jurisdiction, today, could only be doubted by those determined to oppose the
clear trend of the decisions. This situation is exactly that of the nonresident-motorist
statutes, which were long ago upheld, except that the highways are not directly in-
volved.'" Opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, in chambers, denying stay pending appeal
in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1, 3-4 (1965) quoting Currie, The
Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U.
ILL. L.F. 515, 540. See also A.R. Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 328,
73 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1968). "The making of a single contract or the commission of a
single tort, within a jurisdiction may be a contact sufficient .... ." Id. at 333, 73 Cal.
Rptr. at 923, quoting Annot., 2 Law. Ed. 2d 1664, 1666 (1958). Cf. Bay Aviation
Serv. Co. v. District Court, 149 Colo. 547, 370 P.2d 752 (1962) (denying jurisdiction).
87. See notes 72-75 & accompanying text supra.
88. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
89. Id. at 223; see text accompanying note 72 supra.
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One of the leading decisions on this subject is by the Illinois Su-
preme Court in Nelson v. Miller.90 The defendant was a Wisconsin
corporation; injury resulted from the alleged negligence of its employees
in the course of delivering a stove in Illinois. From the report of the
case, it appears that this might have been the only instance of defend-
ant's conduct or activity in the forum. In concluding that jurisdiction
existed, the court stated: "The rational basis of the decisions upholding
the nonresident motorist statutes is broad enough to include the case
in which the nonresident defendant causes injury without the interven-
tion of any particular instrumentality.""1
In California, the same result was reached under old Code of Civil
Procedure section 41192 in the case of James R. Twiss, Ltd. v. Superior
Court." A vessel owned by Twiss, while on an international voyage,
put into port for fuel, where the claimant was injured as a result of an
alleged defect in the vessel. Although this particular entry for fuel
was the only contact of defendant Twiss with California, jurisdiction
was sustained.
Similar cases involving assault, battery, and trespass to land or
chattels or conversion of chattels located in the forum would seem to
pose no problem. In all such cases, the defendant individually, or by
authorized agent, must physically enter the forum and there com-
mit the act which gives rise to the cause of action. Such cases are
indistinguishable from the nonresident motorist cases, once the con-
sent rationale is abandoned. 4 It is also clear that a state may assert
jurisdiction over an absentee owner or occupier of real property when the
cause of action is for injuries resulting from the condition of the
premises." Even before the International Shoe decision, states had
applied the rationale of Hess v. Pawloski to this situation.96
90. 11 Il. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
91. id. at 389, 143 N.E.2d at 679.
92. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, at 343, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 411 (effec-
tive until July 1, 1970).
93. 215 Cal. App. 2d 247, 30 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1963).
94. See notes 72-75 & accompanying text supra.
95. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 38; cf. Long v. Mishicot Modem
Dairy, Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425, 60 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1967); Long involved an action
for breach of contract by defendant to sell 13 acres of land in California. Ownership of
this land was defendant's sole contact with or activity in California. Jurisdiction was
upheld, the court stating: "[Allthough mere ownership of land may not be sufficient
to subject a nonresident to personal jurisdiction in an unrelated cause of action, it
may be sufficient, if the cause of action is related to such ownership." Id. at 428, 60
Cal. Rptr. at 435.
96. Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (Phila. County Ct. 1938).
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B. Conduct or Activity Outside the Forum Resulting in
Harm Within the Forum
There are numerous situations in which the defendant, acting out-
side the forum, may cause harm to a plaintiff in the forum. Within
this general category, there are a number of variations. The defendant
may act with full knowledge of the plaintiff and his locale and with the
intent to affect the plaintiff by his action . 7  The defendant may act
without knowledge of any particular plaintiff or any particular locale,
but with the intent of marketing his product in the forum or affecting
people in the forum by his activities, wherever carried on.9 8 Or, the
defendant may act without knowledge of any particular plaintiff or any
particular locale, but in such a manner that it is at least probable that
his activities will affect people in the forum.9 9 Finally, the defendant
may act with the intent and purpose of confining his product or his
activities to his own locale so that an effect outside his home state will
be fortuitous and unforeseeable. 100
Each of these situations has arisen. Most of the cases have been
in the field of products liability and the discussion that follows is pri-
marily devoted to that subject. However, the problems that arise and
the solutions suggested are not so limited but can extend to any tort




The practical benefits accruing from the enlargement of a state's
long-arm jurisdiction are perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the
products liability cases. Recognizing that large business concerns are
best able to absorb and distribute the losses covered by an inevitable
97. This is particularly true of the defamation cases. See text accompanying
notes 168-88 infra. Note also Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1
(1965), where the major part of the conspiracy was outside the United States but the
primary defendant did make one trip to New York in connection with that conspiracy;
the question arises whether jurisdiction could have been supported if he had not made
that entry into New York.
98. See, e.g., Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409
(1959); Waco-Porter Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 2d 559, 27 Cal. Rptr. 371
(1963).
99. E.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 458, 209 N.E.2d 68,
76, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965).




quantum of defects in today's enormous total output of manufactured
goods, the California Supreme Court has imposed strict liability in tort
upon manufacturers and sellers for injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts.101 But this vital principle, with all the enhanced protection it
affords to consumers in an industrial society, would remain a dead letter
in practice unless complemented by procedural statutes enabling an
injured plaintiff to bring suit in his home state and thereby escape the
prohibitive expense of travelling across the country to maintain an ac-
tion against an out-of-state manufacturer. In cases where the defend-
ant is a foreign corporation, the law under old section 411 has de-
veloped to the extent of permitting a plaintiff injured by a defective
product in California to sue in California whenever the defendant know-
ingly reaped economic benefits from the sale of the product there.102
Section 411, however, applies only to corporations; the more restrictive
provisions of section 417 govern jurisdiction over individuals. New
section 410.10 continues the principles enunciated under section 411,
but those principles will now apply with equal force to all defendants,
individual as well as corporate.
Two jurisdictions normally claim principal interest in cases where
damage results from the use or consumption of a defective product,
whether the cause of action sounds in negligence, strict liability, or
breach of warranty. One jurisdiction is the state where the defendant,
by act or omission, breaches his duty of care or produces the defec-
tive product and puts it in the stream of commerce. The other juris-
diction is the state where the product is purchased and its use or con-
sumption results in harm to plaintiff. A complication arises and a
third jurisdiction must be considered when the product is purchased in
one state and its use results in harm in another state.
10 3
Where the state statute is couched in terms of jurisdiction over a
defendant who "commits a tort within the state," a serious problem of
statutory construction arises in determining whether the tort was com-
mitted in the state where the defendant acted or in the state where the
results of the defendant's conduct were felt. 104 California, by the
broad language of section 410.10, has avoided this preliminary prob-
lem, leaving for its own courts initially, and for the United States Su-
101. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
102. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 A.C. 933, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969).
103. See Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d
8, 24 (1965).
104. See note 17 supra.
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preme Court eventually, to determine the scope of the forum's juris-
diction in these cases.
In practice there is no problem of jurisdiction in the state where
the defendant's act or omission occurred. Normally, and particularly
when the defendant is the manufacturer or producer of goods, the
place where the act or omission occurred will be a state in which
the defendant is "present" and carrying on substantial business and
thus subject to jurisdiction irrespective of the minimum contacts doc-
trine. The serious problems arise when the state where the product
causes harm to the plaintiff seeks to assert its jurisdiction over the out-
of-state producer.
There is a notable lack of consistency among the decisions that
have considered the matter. In part this is due to variations in the
wording of state statutes, so that some of the decisions denying juris-
diction may be predicated on the construction of statutory limitations
on the exercise of jurisdiction rather than on a consideration of the
underlying constitutional bases.'" 5 But many of the decisions do rest
on the due process issue, and there is a basic uncertainty as to what the
minimum contacts doctrine permits in these cases.
The principal cause for the uncertainty is the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Hanson v. Denckla,'°6 a case decided by a bare five-to-
four majority. The factual situation was complex; the following over-
simplification must suffice for this discussion. The case involved the
disposition of the estate of a decedent who had died domiciled in Flor-
ida. The controversy was between parties claiming under the Florida
probate and those claiming under powers of appointment contained in
trusts that had been created when decedent-trustor was domiciled in
Pennsylvania. The trusts were being administered by Delaware cor-
porate trustees. The other necessary parties either having been served
in Florida or having appeared in the proceedings, Florida attempted to
assert jurisdiction over the Delaware trustees by service on them in
Delaware. The Delaware court refused to recognize the Florida judg-
ment against the trustees and the United States Supreme Court sustained
that refusal, holding that the trustees were not subject to the jurisdiction
of the Florida court and its judgment was not entitled to full faith and
105. This is clearly the situation in Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 458, 209
N.E.2d 68, 76, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965). Feathers appears to have influenced the
California courts of appeal in two cases: Leach Co. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. App.
2d 493, 72 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1968), and Gill v. Surgitool Inc., 256 Cal. App. 2d 583,
64 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1967).
106. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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credit in Delaware.
Language in the opinion indicates at least the possibility of a re-
turn to the idea that subjection to jurisdiction is conditioned on a
privilege afforded the defendant and that unless the defendant has
somehow entered the forum and enjoyed a privilege, jurisdiction does
not exist:
[T]his suit cannot be said to be one to enforce an obligation that
arose from a privilege the defendant exercised in Florida ...
. . . The application of that rule [minimum contacts] will vary
with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws.' 0
7
In other words, the "minimum contacts" with the forum state re-
ferred to in International Shoe must amount to "purposeful availment"
of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state. Otherwise
there will be no sufficient basis of jurisdiction; the traditional standards
of "fair play and substantial justice" will not be satisfied. This "pur-
poseful availment" requirement represents the Supreme Court's first
attempt to set a clear outer limit to the minimum contacts doctrine.
If the Court's language is to be taken literally-if "the defendant
[must] purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state"-then some entry, personally or by agent,
representative, distributor or salesman, would seem to be a prerequi-
site. Under such an interpretation, a producer who sold his entire
output to independent distributors f.o.b. the state of production would
not be conducting activities outside his home state and would not be
subject to the jurisdiction of any other state.' 08
It is submitted, however, that any such narrow, restricted approach
to the minimum contacts doctrine is erroneous and should not be fol-
lowed. To look to the formalities of the sales transactions would be to
107. Id. at 252-53. These passages were quoted with approval in the opinion
of Mr. Justice Goldberg, in chambers, denying stay pending appeal, in Rosenblatt v.
American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965). Note also the reference to "privilege" in
International Shoe: "But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of
that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a
procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them
can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue." International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.s. 310, 319 (1945).
108. This was the situation in daSilveira v. Westphalia Separator Co., 248 Cal.
App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1967).
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permit jurisdictional power to be governed by the defendant's mode of
doing business and would enable a defendant to avoid the jurisdiction
of a forum by billing, shipping, and marketing arrangements and de-
vices. It would reintroduce the technicalities that plagued courts under
the old concepts of "presence" and "doing business." And, finally,
it would be inconsistent with the underlying rationale of the Interna-
tional Shoe decision, which stressed the reasonableness of subjecting the
defendant to suit in the forum, in the specific case brought there,
rather than the mechanics of defendant's way of doing business.
Most of the state court decisions have not accepted such a nar-
rowly restrictive view of the minimum contacts doctrine but have taken
jurisdiction, or assumed they could have done so but for a limiting forum
statute, in cases where the defendant did not enter the state or engage in
any activity in the forum but did affect persons or property within the
forum. 10 9 The exact point at which defendant's activities justify such
jurisdiction has not been clearly marked; where it should be marked
depends upon the view that is taken of the meaning and purport of the
minimum contacts doctrine. It is well established in California that
when a corporate defendant is engaged in the direct introduction of its
product into the forum as part of a regular or continuous or substantial
distribution system, 110 or conducts its business under circumstances
that it may reasonably expect that its products will be used or consumed
in the forum in substantial quantities,"' the assumption of jurisdiction
is consistent with due process if the cause of action arises out of an in-
jury caused by a product purchased and used in the forum. The de-
cisions are extremely inconsistent and confusing, however, in cases
where the cause of action is against a supplier who has supplied an
article sporadically or only once which when used in the forum, in-
jures person or property therein.
Several decisions from other jurisdictions are of particular signifi-
109. See, e.g., Lotus Car Ltd. v. Municipal Court, 263 Cal. App. 2d 264, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 384 (1968) (tort); Long v. Mishicot Modern Dairy, Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425,
60 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1967) (contract).
110. "There are numerous 'flow of products in the stream of commerce' cases.
One of them is Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault Billancourt (Seine), France v.
Superior Court, [208 Cal. App. 2d 702, 25 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1962)], a decision of this
court. It holds that a corporation created and owned by the French government
which manufactured Renault automobiles and sold them to a New York corporation, a
wholly owned subsidiary, who sold to various American distributors who sold to dealers
who sold to consumers in California, could not by marketing through a 'hierarchy' of
agents insulate itself against assertion of California jurisdiction." A.R. Indus., Inc. v.
Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 328, 333, 73 Cal. Rptr. 920, 923 (1968).
111. Cf. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
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cance in the interpretation of the minimum contacts doctrine as applied
to out-of-state manufacturers and suppliers in products liability actions;
they furnish a general background with which the state of California
law may profitably be compared. Among these cases are Singer v.
Walker," 2 decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1965,
O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc.," 3 decided by the Vermont Supreme
Court in 1963, and Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp.," 4 decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1961.
In Singer v. Walker, the defendant had manufactured a geologist's
hammer in Illinois which was shipped f.o.b. Illinois to a dealer in New
York who sold it to the plaintiff, who was injured while using it in
Connecticut. The New York court had difficulty with the "tortious
act" provision of the long-arm statute'1 5 but sustained jurisdiction on
the ground that "the cause of action asserted is clearly one 'arising
from' the purposeful activities engaged in by the appellant in this
State in connection with the sale of its products in the New York
market."' " In Singer, New York seemed to take a liberal view of the
jurisdictional issue. Purposeful sales to a New York dealer were held
to constitute a sufficient contact, and no great importance was attached
to the nature and extent of the defendant's in-state distribution system.
In O'Brien, the Vermont plaintiff claimed damages from the pres-
112. 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 24 (1965).
113. 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
114. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
115. The New York long-arm statute in force at that time provided: "A court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary ... as to any cause of
action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section .. . if . .. he:
"2. commits a tortious act within the state. . . ." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 302
(a) (McKinney 1963).
In a companion case to Singer v. Walker, the New York Court of Appeals
held that the defendant had not committed a "tortious act" in New York within the
meaning of the statute and therefore denied jurisdiction on statutory grounds without
reaching the constitutional issue. Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 458, 209 N.E.2d
68, 76, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965). In Feathers, the defendant manufactured a steel
tank in Kansas on order for a Missouri corporation "presumably with knowledge"
that it would eventually be sold to an interstate carrier incorporated in Pennsylvania
and would be used on the highways of several states, including New York. Plaintiffs
sued for damages resulting from an explosion of the tank while being operated on a
New York highway.
As a result of the Feathers decision, the New York legislature quickly amended
section 302(a) by adding subsection 3, which provides: "[Personal jurisdiction may be
obtained over any non-domiciliary who] commits a tortious act without the state causing
injury to person or property within the state. . . ." N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 302(a)(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
116. 15 N.Y.2d at 467, 209 N.E.2d at 82, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
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ence of a deleterious substance in a can of beans which he had pur-
chased in Vermont and which had allegedly been prepared, packed
and "placed in the stream of commerce" by defendant in New York.
This, the Vermont court held, was not sufficient to justify jurisdiction;
but the opinion added that if the defendant had voluntarily or deliber-
ately participated actively in the Vermont market "either by direct ship-
ment or by way of transmittal through regular distributors presently
serving the Vermont market area" its jurisdiction could be sustained.
117
O'Brien thus illustrates a more restrictive and mechanical method of
deciding the minimum contacts question-minimum contacts exist if
either the defendant or its agents conduct certain well-defined business
activities in the forum state.
In Gray the situation was more complex. Plaintiff was injured in
Illinois when a water heater exploded. The heater had been manu-
factured in Pennsylvania by defendant American Radiator and had been
sold and installed in a home in Illinois. Jurisdiction over American
Radiator was not questioned, but American Radiator cross-complained
against a third party, Titan, who had manufactured a valve which had
been incorporated in the heater and which was allegedly the cause of
the explosion. Titan did business in Ohio where the valve had been
manufactured and sold to American Radiator, but it did no business in
Illinois. The Illinois court asserted jurisdiction over Titan, stating:
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the
growing interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a
manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other states. The
fact that the benefit he derives from its laws is an indirect one,
however, does not make it any the less essential to the conduct of
his business; and it is not unreasonable, where a cause of action
arises from alleged defects in his product, to say that the use of such
products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact
with this State to justify a requirement that he defend here.118
Gray is a particularly notable case, for it appears to carry the mini-
mum contacts concept farther than any case to date, and perhaps as
far as is possible within the limits set by Hanson v. Denckla. Under the
Gray rule, an out-of-state manufacturer or supplier is amenable to
long-arm jurisdiction in a products liability action whenever it is shown
that he knowingly placed the defective product in the stream of inter-
state commerce. The Illinois court apparently did not require evidence
that the defendant "purposefully" or foreseeably placed the product
in the particular forum state; rather, it held that such particular place-
117. 123 VL at 464, 194 A.2d at 571.
118. 22 111. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
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ment is always a foreseeable result of a more general introduction of
the product into interstate commerce.
Until very recently, the California courts appeared to be pursuing
two separate approaches, with sometimes one and sometimes the other
predominating. Some of the decisions emphasized a concept of fair-
ness based on balancing the respective conveniences and inconveniences
to the parties between suit in plaintiff's forum state and suit in defend-
ant's home state. In other decisions, the nature of the sales and distri-
bution system was regarded as decisive; jurisdiction was denied unless
defendant, by sales agents, retail outlets, or some other readily identifi-
able distribution system, could be said to be actively entering into and
participating in the California market.1 19
The most significant decision during this period was Cosper v.
Smith & Wesson Arms Co.1 20 In Cosper, defendant was held subject to
the jurisdiction of the California courts in an action for injuries received
in California, resulting from the explosion of a gun manufactured by de-
fendant and purchased from a retailer in California. Defendant did not
do business in California in the traditional sense; it was a Massachusetts
corporation and distributed its products f.o.b. its plant in Massachusetts,
through independent distributors and sales representatives. Sales pro-
motion in California was by an independent company which represented
various manufacturers on a nonexclusive basis. The court held that it
had jurisdiction of the case, reasoning that the representative, by "serv-
icing dealer accounts, investigating and recommending prospective
dealers to Smith and Wesson, arranging publicity, distributing adver-
tising, and handling and reporting complaints" was performing the
same functions and rendering the same services that the defendant
would have, if it had been operating through its own office or paid
sales force. Also, "the gun which exploded was sold in this state,
the accident occurred in this state, the plaintiff is a resident of this
state, and many of the witnesses who will probably be called at the
trial are present in this state."' 21
119. Compare Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d
1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959), and A.R. Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d
328, 73 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1968), with daSilveira v. Westphalia Separator Co., 248 Cal.
App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1967), Twinco Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal.
App. 2d 321, 40 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1964), and Yeek Mfg. Corp. v. Superior Court, 202
Cal. App. 2d 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1962). For further discussion of these two
approaches see note 123 & text accompanying notes 147-51 infra.
120. 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 (1959).
121. Id. at 81, 83, 346 P.2d at 412-13.
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(2) Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court
In the recent case of Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court,'2 2
the California Supreme Court expressly disapproved any jurisdictional
test that depended on the mechanics of the defendant's distribution sys-
tem 123 and postulated in its stead a three step analysis of the relationship
between defendant's business activities and the forum state. In Buck-
eye, the defendant was an Ohio corporation with its principal place
of business in that state. It had sales representatives in some states
but not in others. It solicited sales directly in some states but not
in others. It did not advertise its products. It maintained no sales
agency, representation, outlet or any other means of solicitation of
orders in California. Its only identifiable activity in California was
122. 71 A.C. 933, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
123. In some of the pre-Buckeye court of appeal decisions, the nature of the sales
distribution system was regarded as decisive of jurisdiction. This was particularly true
in three decisions where jurisdiction was denied: Yeck Mfg. Corp. v. Superior Court,
202 Cal. App. 2d 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1962); Twinco Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court,
230 Cal. App. 2d 321, 40 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1964); daSilveira v. Westphalia Separator
Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1967).
In Yeck, the defendant, a Michigan manufacturer, sold to a California distributor
who in turn sold to a California retailer. In Twinco, the defendant sold to an out-of-
state distributor who in turn sold to a California retailer. In daSilveira, the defendant,
a German corporation, sold to a New York corporation that had exclusive distribution
rights, and the distributor in turn sold to plaintiff. In all three cases, the courts
found a lack of contact between the defendant and the forum to support jurisdiction.
See the analysis in Yeck. 202 Cal. App. 2d at 651-53, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 54-56. In
daSilveira, the court relied particularly on the decision in Hanson v. Denckla, pointing
out that "there was no act by which [the defendant had] purposefully availed itself of
[any] privilege of conducting business in California." 248 Cal. App. 2d at 793, 57 Cal.
Rptr. at 65.
In Lotus Car Ltd. v. Municipal Court, 263 Cal. App. 2d 264, 69 Cal. Rptr. 384
(1968), the nature of the sales and distribution system was regarded as significant, the
court stating: "[T]he real party in interest proved . . . that petitioner is listed in the
telephone directory in three California counties; that a firm in one of these counties
advertises sales, parts and accessories for petitioner's cars; and that four named dis-
tributors in this state are actively engaged in sales promotion and service of petitioner's
cars. This evidence supports a finding that there were minimum contacts sufficient to
sustain service of process upon petitioner." Id. at 271, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 389. See also
Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 134, 214 P.2d 541 (1950).
"If the representation which petitioner maintained in the state gave it in a practical
sense, and to a substantial degree, the benefits and advantages it would have enjoyed by
operating through its own office or paid sales force, it was clearly doing business in
the state so as to be amenable to civil process.
". .. Petitioner's methods .. . would appear to give it substantially the same
commercial advantages that would be available to it through an office or a force of
employees maintained in the state devoted exclusively to this phase of the business."
Id. at 136-37, 214 P.2d at 542-43. The above language was quoted with approval in
Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 82-83, 346 P.2d 409, 413 (1959).
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some sales of pressure tanks to the Cochin Manufacturing Company,
located in South San Francisco, which Cochin incorporated in a product
it manufactured and sold. The cause of action in the specific suit
before the court arose when a pressure tank manufactured by Buckeye
exploded in a General Electric plant in California and injured the plain-
tiff. There was nothing to indicate how that particular tank came to be
in California, or even how it came into the possession of General Elec-
tric. There was no connection between defendant's business with Cochin
and the tank which caused plaintiff's injury.
On the basis of the record before it, the California Supreme Court
held that a prima facie showing of jurisdiction had been established.
The end result is sound; however, the process by which the court
reached that result is not as clear as it might be, and the opinion raises
several questions that are likely to cause difficulty in subsequent cases.
Initially it should be noted that in holding that a prima facie case
had been established, the court stated that "[t]he plaintiff has the
burden of showing that a defendant is doing business in California for
purposes of section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure."'' 24  However,
when plaintiff establishes that a substantial amount of defendant's busi-
ness is conducted through channels of interstate commerce and de-
fendant does engage in some "substantial economic activity" in the
state, the burden 25 passes to the defendant to show that the presence of
the object which injured the plaintiff was fortuitous and unforeseeable
and that the defense of the particular action would be unreasonably
burdensome to defendant.'26
Also preliminarily, it should be noted that the decision is not a
final determination of Buckeye's amenability to jurisdiction in a Cali-
fornia forum. The court noted that Buckeye's position in the trial
court had been predicated largely upon state appellate decisions stress-
ing the importance of a sales or distribution system in the forum state.
127
These decisions were disapproved, 2 8 and Buckeye was afforded the
124. 71 A.C. at 945 n.9, 458 P.2d at 66 n.9, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122 n.9.
125. The court did not specify whether this "burden of proof" is the burden of
producing evidence or the burden of persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of
the evidence. See generally CAL. EvID. CODE § 115.
126. 71 A.C. at 945 n.9, 458 P.2d at 66 n.9, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122 n.9.
127. E.g., Gill v. Surgitool, Inc., 256 Cal. App. 2d 583, 64 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1967);
daSilveira v. Westphalia Separator Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62
(1967); Twinco Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 2d 321, 40 Cal. Rptr. 833
(1964); Yeck Mfg. Corp. v. Superior Court; 202 Cal. App. 2d 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51
(1962). For a discussion of this mechanical "checklist" approach, see note 123 and
text accompanying notes 119-23 supra.
128. 71 A.C. at 943, 458 P.2d at 65, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
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opportunity of making a further evidentiary showing before the trial
court, in conformity with the legal principles announced in the supreme
court opinion.
129
(i) Obtaining Economic Benefit from Sales Within the State-
Purposeful Availment As a Matter of Commercial Actuality
Turning to the main thrust of the opinion, the court stated three
separate conditions that had to be met before jurisdiction could con-
stitutionally be assumed. First, to comply with Hanson v. Denckla,
there must be some act "by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state."' 3 °
Second, "the particular cause of action must arise out of or be con-
nected with the defendant's forum-related activity.' 131  Third, there
must be a determination that it is fair to proceed based "upon a balanc-
ing of the inconvenience to the defendant in having to defend itself in
the forum state against both the interest of the plaintiff in suing locally
and the interrelated interest of the state in assuming jurisdiction."" 2
The court attempted to satisfy the first of its three conditions and
the rule of Hanson v. Denckla on the basis of defendant's transactions
with Cochin Manufacturing Company by stating:
In the present case, it is clear that defendant derives sub-
stantial economic benefit from the sale and use of its products in
California; it currently derives about $30,000 annually in gross
sales revenues from its direct sales of certain pressure tanks to the
Cochin Manufacturing Company plant in South San Francisco.
On the basis of these sales alone, defendant is purposefully engaging
in economic activity within California as a matter of "commercial
actuality.'
33
However, since the injury admittedly was not caused by any
product that defendant sold to Cochin, the linkage between the first
condition and the second condition was apparently lacking. To pro-
vide the connection, the court offered a two-span bridge. The first
span was that somehow the use of the tank that injured plaintiff, to-
gether with the sales to Cochin, could be taken together as defendant's
"total economic activity in California"'134 and therefore "plaintiff's
cause of action appears to arise from Buckeye's economic activity in
129. Id. at 945-46, 458 P.2d at 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
130. Id. at 938, 458 P.2d at 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 118, quoting Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
131. 71 A.C. at 939, 458 P.2d at 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
132. Id.




California, to wit, the totality of its sales of pressure tanks to California
customers or to other customers for foreseeable resale or use in Califor-
nia."''3  The other span was that for all that appeared in the record,
Buckeye was engaged in the manufacture and distribution of pressure
tanks in such a fashion that it was both reasonable and foreseeable that
its products (apart from sales to Cochin) might well be used in Cali-
fornia.'
1 6
However, the exact nature of this second span becomes confusing
because of the court's lack of clarity in its exposition-was it con-
cerned with the foreseeability of the presence of the particular tank
which injured plaintiff, or merely with the foreseeability of the presence
of pressure tanks in the ordinary course of business? This confusion is
illustrated by two statements in the opinion. At one point the court
states: "Buckeye did not allege before the trial court that the tank
which allegedly injured plaintiff arrived in California in a manner so
fortuitous and unforeseeable as to demonstrate that its placement here
was not purposeful."' 37 Here obviously the emphasis is on the particu-
lar tank. But later in the opinion the court states: "The plaintiff has
made a sufficient prima facie showing that his injury arose from or is
connected with purposeful activity in California-direct and indirect
sales of pressure tanks-which produces economic benefit for Buckeye
as a matter of 'commercial actuality.' " 38 Here, equally obviously, the
emphasis is on the general nature of the business and not on the process
which brought the offending tank to California.
It is submitted that in its statement and application of the first two
conditions, the court has confused the jurisdictional issues and has
failed satisfactorily to answer these basic questions: What is the real
significance, if any, of the sales to Cochin; and is it essential that the
presence of the particular offending tank be foreseeable?
With respect to the sales to Cochin, it is suggested that they are
entirely irrelevant except as a makeweight. It is not even arguable
that Buckeye's sales to Cochin constituted "doing business" under the
traditional pre-International Shoe doctrine, and hence those sales could
not support a finding of "presence" sufficient to support jurisdiction on
an unrelated cause of action. 3 It is admitted that the cause of action
sued upon did not arise out of Buckeye's sales to Cochin. Therefore,
135. Id. at 945, 458 P.2d at 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
136. Id. at 944, 458 P.2d at 65-66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22.
137. Id. at 945, 458 P.2d at 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
138. Id. at 947, 458 P.2d at 67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
139. See id. at 938-39, 458 P.2d at 61, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
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the right of plaintiff to maintain the action should depend upon the
character of the activities that resulted in the offending product being
present in California and not on the character of other activities having
no relation to the offending product or its presence in California. In
the setting of Buckeye Boiler, the Cochin sales helped plaintiff. But the
critical question is whether, if there had been no sales to Cochin, juris-
diction over Buckeye would have been constitutionally permissible.
The court's emphasis in parts of the opinion on the Cochin sales would
seem to indicate its view that jurisdiction could not be taken. However,
the court's position on the necessity of the Cochin sales was not per-
fectly clear. In another part of the opinion, the court seemed to recog-
nize that the exploding tank, by itself, could have supported jurisdic-
tion if its presence within the state was not so fortuitous and unforsee-
able as to "manifest lack of purposeful activity on the part of the manu-
facturer."' 40
(ii) A Foreseeability Test
It is submitted that the uncertainties in Buckeye should be re-
solved in favor of applying a foreseeability test in cases of this type.
There should be no requirement of activity in the forum by agents
or representatives or of sales to known purchasers in the forum. The
proper basis is: The defendant should be subject to suit in the plain-
tiff's forum whenever, by the manner in which he conducts his busi-
ness or carries on his activity, he might reasonably expect a harm-
ful effect in the forum where harm does, in fact, ensue. Thus if
the defendant corporation either engages in nationwide distribution
of its product or knowingly introduces its product into a particular
forum, it should be subject to suit there for harm resulting from a defect
in that product. 4 '
On this basis, the existence of a distribution system in the forum
is relevant on the issue of whether the defendant could reasonably have
anticipated the distribution and use of his product in the forum state.
But an actual distribution system in that forum is not necessary, and
Buckeye, by its repudiation of that rationale used by some of the earlier
cases, 142 greatly assists in clarifying the doctrine. But that clarifica-
tion is unfortunately offset by the suggestion that except in one situa-
tion, if the particular tank that injured plaintiff had arrived in Cali-
140. Id. at 944, 458 P.2d at 65, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
141. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
142. These cases are cited in note 127 supra.
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fornia in a fortuitous and unforeseeable manner, jurisdiction could
not be taken.143  This apparent emphasis on how the tank that ex-
ploded came to be in California, rather than an emphasis on the gen-
eral nature of Buckeye's business and the foreseeability of Buckeye's
tanks in general being put to use in California and elsewhere, seems
misplaced. There is little doubt, from a reading of the opinion, that it
was foreseeable that Buckeye tanks were likely to be in use everywhere
in the United States.' 44 And it is suggested that the correct rule-and
the one apparently accepted by the New York145 and Illinois 146 courts-
is that it is not how the particular offending article came into the forum
but whether it is foreseeable that any of defendant's products, but not
necessarily any particular one, would be put to use in the forum.
Such an approach, it is submitted, is entirely consistent with the
minimum contacts doctrine as originally expounded in International
Shoe and as subsequently interpreted in McGee and Hanson. The
crucial issue, as posited by International Shoe, was whether the de-
fendant was linked to the forum by a contact sufficient to justify sub-
jecting him to that forum's jurisdiction. McGee recognized that physi-
cal entry into the state was not necessary to effect such a contact, but that
correspondence with an identified person in the forum sufficed. The
limitation imposed by Hanson, under the facts of that case, may-and it
is suggested should-mean no more than that any such contact must
be attributable in some manner to the action or activity of the defendant
and not to the action or activity of a third person. But when the manu-
facturer or producer proceeds to put his product into a stream of com-
merce that is designed, or is likely to, and in fact does, end in use, con-
sumption, or effect in the forum, the contact is established and is at-
143. This exceptional situation arises where the out-of-state defendant has en-
gaged, as did Buckeye, in some "substantial economic activity" (e.g., sales to Cochin
Mfg. Co.). The court in Buckeye held that in this situation, in order to defeat juris-
diction, the defendant must prove both that the tank entered California in so fortuitous
and unforeseeable manner as to demonstrate that its placement there was not purpose-
ful, and that the burden of defending the present action in California would be sub-
stantially different in its nature and extent than the burden of defending actions that
might arise from the sale of pressure tanks to Cochin. 71 A.C. at 945, 458 P.2d at 66,
80 Cal. Rptr. at 122. See text accompanying notes 124-26 supra. Thus, there can be
situations, according to Buckeye, where jurisdiction will be upheld even though the
injury-producing product has arrived in the forum completely fortuitously and unfore-
seeably.
144. See 71 A.C. at 937, 458 P.2d at 60-61, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 116-17.
145. Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 24
(1965).
146. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IlL. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
May 1970]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tributable to the action or activity of defendant. This, it seems, is the
teaching of McGee; by a parity of reasoning, if the trust in Hanson had
been executed after the trustor became domiciled in Florida, there seems
no reason to doubt the ability of Florida to subject the trustee to its
jurisdiction, even though all arrangements were made at the home
office in Delaware and no agent or officer of the trustee ever set foot in
Florida.
If this approach is correct, then direct sales to unrelated purchasers
are not necessary if the introduction of the product into the forum was
foreseeable. And this, by a sort of inverse logic, appears to be the
necessary result of the repeated references by the court in Buckeye to
the requirement that the presence of the defective tank not be fortui-
tous or unforeseeable. The injury admittedly arose from the explosion
in California of a tank manufactured by the defendant. Whatever
cause of action there might have been came to fruition in California.
If the defendant's other activities were sufficient to satisfy the minimum
contacts doctrine-the purposeful availment or the activity in the forum
-then it should not matter how or in what manner the particular offend-
ing tank came to rest in the forum state. But if it is important to de-
termine how, or in what manner that tank came to rest in California, it
is only because that event, and no other, must provide the jurisdictional
predicate under the minimum contacts doctrine.
(iii) Balance of Conveniences
Although the Buckeye decision disapproved one of the two major
themes that ran through the prior California cases, it reemphasized with-
out any substantial variation the second theme-the idea that "the
propriety of an assumption of [long-arm] jurisdiction depend[ed] [in
part] upon a balancing of the inconvenience to the defendant in having
to defend itself in the forum state against both the interest of the plain-
tiff in suing locally and the interrelated interest of the state in assuming
jurisdiction. "147 This balance of convenience concept-the third con-
dition stated in Buckeye-is a theme first expounded by the California
Supreme Court in Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court.14 8  Among
the matters there alluded to were:
The interest of the state in providing a forum for its residents
...the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense
and prosecution in one place rather than another, the ease of access
to an alternate forum, the avoidance of multiplicity of suits and
147. 71 A.C. at 939, 458 P.2d at 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
148. 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959).
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conflicting adjudications, and the extent to which the cause of ac-
tion arose out of defendant's local activities. 149
What was probably the fullest exposition of this view was in A.R. In-
dustries, Inc. v. Superior Court:150
[A.R.] Industries maintained no office, owned no property, sent no
traveling salesmen, into California. But it did advertise in national
media and the products described above had been sold and de-
livered by Industries into California for use (as distinct from re-
sale). We do not deem the fact decisive but the infrequency of
California transactions may be related to the fact that these ma-
chines were manufactured to specification and were of a size and
nature calculated to supply a restricted market. "Minimum con-
tacts" in California were established. We turn to "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice." Industries has bene-
fited by, and received the protection of, the laws of California. It
thus owed corresponding obligations. The cause of action arose
here. We balance the inconvenience to Industries in coming into
California to defend this suit against the probability that indispens-
able witnesses probably reside here, and we consider the cost, the
difficulty, and perhaps the impossibility of ascertainment of truth
of the merits of Cervantes' [plaintiff's] claim should it have to pro-
secute its claim in an eastern jurisdiction.' 51
It is suggested that the supreme court, in Buckeye, passed up an op-
portunity to make clear whether it is concerned with this balance of
convenience as a condition for the constitutional exercise of jurisdic-
tion, or the discretionary exercise of jurisdiction by consideration of
forum non conveniens. 52 These are two fundamentally different con-
cepts, with distinctly different results for the plaintiff. For if the
issue of reasonableness is part of the jurisdictional test in a constitu-
tional sense and may result in a dismissal for want of jurisdiction, the
application of the statute of limitations may leave plaintiff without a
remedy. But if the issue of reasonableness is a discretionary one, under
forum non conveniens, the court may condition a dismissal on defend-
ant's waiver of any statute of limitations and thus preserve plaintiff's
rights." 8
149. Id. at 225-26, 347 P.2d at 3-4, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 3-4 (citations omitted).
150. 268 Cal. App. 2d 328, 73 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1968).
151. Id. at 336, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
152. A companion provision of new section 410.10 codifies the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. See CAL. CODE Clv. PROC. § 410.30 (operative July 1, 1970). For a
more extended discussion of the doctrine as it relates to California and the relation it
bears to constitutional jurisdiction questions, see Note, Forum Non Conveniens in Cal-
ifornia: Code of Civil Procedure Section 410.30, 21 HASTINGS L.J 1245 (1970).
153. Vargas v. A.H. Bull S.S. Co., 25 NJ. 293, 135 A.2d 857 (1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 958 (1958); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d 518,
275 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1966); Wendel v. Hoffman, 259 App. Div. 732, 18 N.Y.S.2d 96
(1940).
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This matter needs to be clarified, and it is to be hoped that the
court will clarify it in the direction of the applicability of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens and not as an independent jurisdictional
ground. As first expounded in International Shoe, the reasonableness
of suit in the forum was expressed in terms of a consequence flowing
from the existence of minimum contacts and not as a separate standard.
The language used was: "[S]uch contacts of the corporation with the
state of the forum as make it reasonable . . . to require the corporation
to defend the particular suit which is brought there." 154  This would
seem to imply that if the contacts were adequate, the maintenance of
the suit was per se reasonable.
As a practical matter, however, it is not likely that the balance, on
the issue of reasonableness, will ever preponderate against the state in
which the injury occurred. Four factors appear to enter into the deter-
mination of reasonableness: financial burden, possibility of a "home
town" decision, availability of evidence and knowledge of applicable
law, and finally avoidance of a multiplicity of actions.
With respect to financial burden, all factors favor the state of in-
jury, particularly when that state is also the state of plaintiff's residence.
Usually he will be without resources adequate to prosecute the case
elsewhere, whereas the defendant can usually include the cost of de-
fense as part of the cost of doing business and spread the risk of litiga-
tion over the entire commercial enterprise.
With respect to fairness in end result and the dangers of a "home
town" decision, there would seem to be little danger of local prejudice
in most tort cases (except for the defamation cases, which present a
special problem),1 5 and to the extent that there might be some such
possibility, the plaintiff is as likely to be prejudiced by suit against the
defendant in his home as the defendant is in the reverse situation. At
the very best, in the ordinary tort case, the possibilities of prejudice for
or against either party are no more likely to exist in the one state than
in the other.
With respect to availability of evidence and familiarity with con-
trolling law, the odds are heavily weighted in favor of the state where
the injury occurred. Normally, that is where the eye witnesses to the
event, the product itself, the medical testimony, in fact nearly every
item of proof will be located. Only when there is a substantial issue
of whether due care was exercised in the manufacture of the product-
154. 326 U.S. at 317.
155. See text accompanying notes 168-88 infra.
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an issue that is rapidly disappearing as strict liability supersedes negli-
gence in the field of products liability 5 ---will there be material evi-
dence in the defendant's home state. And under prevailing conflict of
laws doctrine, the forum in which the injury occurred will also be the
state whose law will govern, unless the introduction of the product
therein and the ensuing injury in that locale were purely fortuitous. 5 7
Finally, in the products liability cases there are usually two and
often three defendants: the local retailer or distributor or user, the
regional intermediate distributor, and the national manufacturer. Juris-
diction over the local defendant may be assumed in most of the cases
from the fact that his place of business is in the forum; it may also be
assumed that in most cases the retailer will seek relief from his supplier
or from the ultimate manufacturer. Unless all issues of liability among
all parties can be settled in one action, there is grave danger of injustice
because of different courts reaching different results, either on different
evidence or on different theories of liability. And even when the re-
sults in all actions coincide, there is still the advantage of avoiding a
multiplicity of suits.
(3) Additional Problems
There are two aspects of the broad problem which do not fit pre-
cisely the pattern and analysis of the minimum contacts doctrine. One
is the case of a retail merchant doing business in an area that extends
over two states, with his outlet in one state and many of his customers in
the other."' If, in such a case, the merchant conducts all operations,
including sale or service and delivery, in his own state, he will never in-
ject himself into-will never have a "contact" with-the other state.
In the event of harm to person or property in the second state from a
defective product, can jurisdiction be maintained in that second state?
All of the arguments for convenience of parties and witnesses and rea-
sonableness of forum would support such jurisdiction, but under Han-
son, such convenience is not enough. 59 Because there is no activity
156. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
157. SEcoND RESTATEmENT OF CONFLICTS § 145, comment e at 11.
158. The Stateline area of South Lake Tahoe might well present such problems.
159. Hanson warns that "restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts . . . are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant
litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective states." 357 U.S. at 251. It would seem that unless and until Hanson
is expressly overruled on this point, the boundary line will govern. But cf. Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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by the defendant in the second state, no credit extended to customers in
that state, the argument could be made that the defendant has not pur-
posefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in
that state. This argument, however, is likely to fail in view of Buckeye's
discussion of foreseeability and its equation of purposeful availment with
economic benefit.
The other special problem arises where the manufacturer conducts
his business in one state, the purchaser obtains the product from a re-
tailer in a second state, and the injury results while the article is being
used in still a third state. The New York case of Singer v. Walker'00 is
a prototype of this situation, and it seems clear that the New York court
was correct in taking jurisdiction because the sale was made there. But
to pose a variation on Singer-what if Singer had chosen to sue in
Connecticut, where the injury occurred? Or what if, in Cosper,-6'
plaintiff had been injured by the defective gun while hunting in Mon-
tana and elected to sue there? We may assume in these hypothetical
situations that the nature of defendant's business is such that it has
"minimum contacts" with each state, but is the suit maintainable in
both the state of purchase and the state of injury, or in only one, and if
so in which one? Elements of convenience and reasonableness with
respect to trial would favor jurisdiction only in the state where the in-
jury occurred. But can it be said, consistent with International Shoe,
that a suit in the state of injury arose out of defendant's contacts with
that state? There is, as yet, no authoritative answer to these questions.
It is suggested that since the connection between the cause of action
and the contact is in the state where the article was purchased, and to
avoid the possibility of a basic jurisdictional defect, suit in such cases
should not be brought in the state of injury.
Thus far the discussion has been limited to the fields of products
liability. To round out the discussion we need to consider, and, by
analogy, apply the same doctrines to various miscellaneous torts.
"[Tihe trend in defining due process of law is away from the emphasis on territorial
limitations and toward emphasis on providing adequate notice and opportunity to be
heard: from the court with immediate power over the defendant, toward the court
in which both parties can most conveniently settle their dispute." Id. at 440-41, 176
N.E.2d at 765.
160. 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 24 (1965); see text
accompanying notes 115-16 supra.
161. Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 (1959);
see text accompanying notes 119-21 supra.




Normally confinement will be by act of the defendant personally,
or by agent, within the forum and will be indistinguishable in its juris-
dictional aspects from the intentional torts of battery and assault. How-
ever, if the imprisonment is accomplished by action in another state
which sets in motion the force that confines the plaintiff, jurisdiction
should be maintainable on the same basis as in the case of the supplier
supplying a known user in the forum.1"2
(2) Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution
The appropriate forum here should be the state out of which the
process issued. There is no doubt that an out-of-state defendant who
procures the issuance of process by a forum court, for the purpose of
harassing or interfering with person or property within the forum, is
subject to jurisdiction under even the strictest and most limited interpre-
tation of Hanson v. Denckla. What is not so clear is whether the state
of plaintiff's residence may assume jurisdiction when the process was
issued in another state with the intent of harassing the plaintiff or inter-
fering directly or indirectly with his activities in the forum. So long as
Hanson remains, with its emphasis on some act by which the defendant
purposefully availed himself of a forum privilege, it would seem that
jurisdiction could not be maintained by the plaintiff's state in the latter
situation. But if Hanson is limited to permit a wider range to the
plaintiff's choice of forum, the factors of reasonableness and fairness
would seem to favor jurisdiction in the plaintiffs home state. 163
(3) Fraud
There are several different factual situations which may furnish
the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in a fraud case. The most ob-
vious situation is where the defendant, while personally present in Cali-
fornia, makes the representations which are the gravamen of the action
in a personal encounter with the plaintiff. Here both the wrongful act
and the harm to plaintiff occur in California, and exercise of jurisdiction
is clearly proper.'
6 4
Another situation is where the defendant, by mail or other means of
162. See Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law
and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1951).
163. See generally Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 A.C. 933, 458 P.2d
57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 544-60.
164. Cf. Ehrenzweig, supra note 162.
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communication from outside California addressed to the plaintiff in the
forum, makes the representations which are the gravamen of the ac-
tion. Here the wrongful act of the defendant occurs outside the forum;
it may be that the defendant never entered the forum in connection
with the transaction. It is submitted that this is a proper case for
forum jurisdiction by analogy to McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co.
The third situation is where the subject matter of the transaction,
concerning which the representations are made, is physically located in
California, but both parties are nonresidents of the state and all con-
tacts between them take place outside the state. In this situation it is
possible to support jurisdiction in the state. There is a contact with the
state in that the subject matter is located here, and this should be suffi-
cient for jurisdiction. But this contact seems insubstantial with respect
to the matters of fairness to the parties and the opportunity for a trial in
a jurisdiction bearing a reasonable relation to parties and issues. There
is no indication that any interest of the state will suffer as a result of the
conduct of the parties. There is nothing to indicate that a trial in Cali-
fornia is fairer to the parties than a trial in the state of defendant's resi-
dence or plaintiffs residence. About the only justification that can be
urged is the convenience of obtaining evidence and producing witnesses
concerning the value of the local property.16 5
(4) Interference with Business Relations-Unfair Competition
and Inducing Breach of Contract
It may be assumed that if the action is brought in California it will
normally involve both a business carried on in California and acts by
defendant in, or involving persons or property in, California. In such
cases courts have sustained jurisdiction over the defendant served out-
side the state.' 66
However, a situation may be posited in which the defendant, for
the purpose of injuring a competitor in California, engages in unfair
competition wholly outside the state, either by inducing an out-of-state
supplier to cut off the plaintiffs supply or by inducing out-of-state
purchasers to cease doing business with the plaintiff. In such a case, if
Hanson is strictly and literally followed, it would appear that no juris-
165. See the balancing test used by the courts in the cases cited in note 163 and
in the text accompanying notes 148, 150 supra.
166. See Opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, in chambers, on denial of stay pending
appeal in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965); Carl F.W. Borg-
ward v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 72, 330 P.2d 790 (1958); Henry R. Jahn & Son v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 438 (1958).
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diction exists in California, but it is suggested that the rationale that
supports jurisdiction in the case of the producer who puts his goods in
the stream of commerce, knowing they will be distributed in the
forum, should equally support jurisdiction in the unfair competition
situation.
167
(5) Defamation and Privacy
Actions for defamation and invasion of privacy present special
problems, and long-arm jurisdiction in these cases seems to be de-
veloping under special rules.168 Thus far these rules have been applied
on an ad hoc basis without any clear pattern emerging. The United
States Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue, and the principal
decisions are from the Federal Courts of Appeals in the Second and
Fifth Circuits.
The unique problem in these cases is the obvious danger inherent
in subjecting the media of public information and opinion to defamation
or privacy actions in the plaintiff's home state when the publication
concerns emotionally charged political issues or controversial public
figures. What seems to have developed thus far is an attempt to arrive
at a reasonable balance between the plaintiff's interest in bringing the
action in his home state and the potential danger that defense in the
plaintiff's state might subject the defendant to the risk of an unreason-
able result in both liability and damages.
Under a normal analysis of the minimum contacts doctrine, a de-
famatory publication must be regarded as producing its harm in the
state where the object of the publication resides or where his principal
activities are centered. And one who publishes a defamatory article
about a well-known public figure in a media having wide circulation
can hardly contend that there was no regular and continuous distribu-
tion of the publication in the plaintiff's home state, or that substantial
167. Cf. Opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, in chambers, on denial of stay pending
appeal in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1, 3 (1965).
168. The principal defamation cases are Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d
586 (5th Cir. 1967), Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967),
and New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966). In Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966), plaintiff, a resident of State X,
brought suit in State Y, which had no relation to either plaintiff or defendant; this was
done apparently because State Y's laws were more favorable than State X's. Process
was quashed since the forum had no relation to or minimum contact with the claim.
See also Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts,
66 MicH. L. REv. 227 (1967); Comment, Constitutional Limitations to Long Arm
Jurisdiction in Newspaper Libel Cases, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 436 (1967); Comment,
Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Publishers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 67 CoLum. L. REv.
342 (1967).
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distribution of at least the issue or issues containing the alleged defama-
tion could not be anticipated. By analogy to the products liability
cases that have emphasized the known or anticipated distribution of the
product in the forum, all the elements for jurisdiction are present.
But balancing these established considerations is the concern of
the courts that excessive or unreasonable extension of jurisdiction in de-
famation cases may seriously interfere with the exercise of rights pro-
tected by the first amendment. Some states have avoided the issue
by expressly excluding defamation suits from the scope of their long-
arm statutes. 16 9 But since California does not provide any exclusions
not required by the Constitution, the question must be faced whether
there are special jurisdictional limitations on these actions because of
the guarantees of either the due process clause or the first amendment.
The principal case denying jurisdiction is the Fifth Circuit holding
in New York Times Co. v. Connor.170  The action was brought in
Alabama by a resident of Alabama against the New York Times. The
alleged defamation was an advertisement in the New York Times pro-
testing the activities of Alabama law enforcemefit officers, including
Connor, in Alabama during certain civil rights demonstrations. The
Times had a circulation in Alabama of 395 daily and 2455 on Sunday.
The circulation was held to be too insubstantial to sustain jurisdiction,
the court stating that a newspaper could not be sued for circulating a
libel within a state "where the size of his circulation does not balance
the danger of his liability.' 171 In a subsequent case in the same circuit,
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino,172 jurisdiction was sustained when
the defendant was a magazine of national circulation. The distinction
stated in the Golino opinion was described as follows: "To argue that
periodic lawsuits resulting from circulation of the Post will chill the
desire of Curtis to actively encourage the widest possible circulation is
clearly out of line with economic realities.' 73
In Buckley v. New York Post Corp.,7 the Second Circuit sustained
169. "[A] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary
who in person or through an agent:
"2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act ...... N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302
(McKinney 1966).
170. 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
171. Id. at 572.
172. 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967).
173. Id. at 592.
174. 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).
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jurisdiction in Connecticut, the state of plaintiffs residence, in an action
against a New York newspaper. The Connor decision was distin-
guished, in part, on grounds that the state court in which the Buck-
ley action had been commenced was in a county that was "economically
and intellectually one" with New York City, the center of defendant's
activities and the place of publication. 175  But the court also alluded
to the explosiveness of the issues and the relationship of the parties to
the local scene in the Connor case as matters which created a serious
possibility of a prejudicial outcome.1 "
There are several separate and distinct threads running through
these decisions. The first is the nature and scope of the media, the dis-
tinction being clearly made in the Connor and Golino cases between
newspapers and magazines.1 7 7 A newspaper apparently is regarded as
a local activity and therefore less subject to suit away from its state of
publication than a national magazine, which not only seeks but must
have a national circulation for its existence. But this distinction is
hard to draw when the newspaper is one that enjoys a national reputa-
tion and seeks a national circulation. 1 8  Furthermore, the rationale for
the distinction as stated in the Golino case 7 0 seems wrong. The vital
consideration is not whether the suit will chill the desire of the publica-
tion to seek the widest possible circulation, but whether the suit will
chill the desire of the publication to speak out on public issues.
The second thread, alluded to in the Connor case, is the size of the
circulation in the forum state. On superficial analysis, consideration of
this factor may seem to be justified by analogy to those products liability
cases which have required a regular practice of substantial distribution
and sale within the forum as a predicate to long-arm jurisdiction over
the manufacturer. But it is submitted that this analysis is faulty, be-
cause the publisher of an article that is defamatory of a known, identi-
fied person, particularly a public figure, can be certain that the offend-
ing issue will have a substantial distribution in the home state of the in-
dividual, even if prior issues had little or no distribution in the area. If
any analogy is to be drawn with the products liability cases, it should
be drawn with the supplier who directly supplies a defective article to a
known and identified purchaser in the forum state.18 0  And in those
175. Id. at 184.
176. Id. at 182, 184.
177. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586, 590-91 (5th Cir. 1967).
178. See Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1967).
179. 383 F.2d at 590-91.
180. See, e.g., Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409
(1959).
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cases there seems little reason to doubt that jurisdiction will lie in the
purchaser's state.
The third thread is the danger of prejudice in the handling or out-
come of the case in the courts of the forum. This, in the Second
Circuit's view, is the major implication of the Connor decision.'"' If
this is the thrust of the decisions, another question emerges: Is the
danger of prejudice, as a limitation on long-arm jurisdiction, peculiar
to defamation cases or is it available in other tort actions when local in-
fluences may seriously tip the scales of justice in favor of the resident
plaintiff?
8 2
In the International Shoe case, the Supreme Court stated that in
considering the reasonableness of requiring the defendant to defend in
a particular forum, an " 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would re-
sult to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal
place of business is relevant . ... "Is Later in the same opinion,
there is the statement that "[w]hether due process is satisfied must
depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the pur-
pose of the due process clause to insure."'"" It is arguable that this
language is capable of being construed to require a consideration of all
the factors that might affect the fairness of the outcome, that dangers of
prejudice are included in the "estimate of the inconveniences" and that
"fair and orderly administration of the laws" requires an appraisal of
the dangers of prejudicial treatment. But it is submitted that this is a
strained and far-fetched interpretation of the language of the decision
and the meaning of the minimum contacts doctrine.18 5  It is also sub-
mitted that to inject this issue into all cases of long-arm jurisdiction
would create hopeless uncertainty that would be far worse than the un-
certainty that resulted from the old concept of "doing business." It
can only be concluded that the defamation and privacy cases are sui
181. See 365 F.2d at 572.
182. In Connor, the Court suggests that defamation, being peculiarly affected
by the first amendment, requires a greater degree of contact "to satisfy the due process
clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other types of tortious activity."
Id.
183. 326 U.S. at 317.
184. Id. at 319.
185. But compare the approach of the court of appeal in A.R. Indus., Inc. v.
Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 328, 73 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1968), where the court
uses a two-step analysis: First determining that minimum contacts were established in
California, then proceeding to consider whether on a balance of conveniences, and a
consideration of "fair play," defendant should be required to defend. Cf. Fisher Gov-
ernor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959).
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generis and that if special limitations on jurisdiction are imposed in
these cases they are exceptions to the minimum contacts doctrine re-
sulting from a greater concern for freedom of expression when national
figures and national issues are involved. If this is to be the approach,
then the defamation cases must develop their own special jurisdictional
rules. To that end, the following suggestions are made.
If the distinction between the newspaper and the national maga-
zine, or between the local publication and the national publication, is
a valid one, then like distinctions should exist in the other media of
public information, notably in radio and television, between the broad-
cast that is limited to the local station and the broadcast that is pro-
duced over a national network. However, it is believed that this dis-
tinction, as well as the distinction on the basis of circulation in the forum,
is unsound and that the real problem is with the danger of prejudice.
But it is also submitted that this is not a jurisdictional issue and the pro-
tection against a prejudiced court and jury should be sought in other
legal doctrines.186
The Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1 87 has
mitigated much of the danger by establishing a constitutional standard
and has thus provided the foundation for Supreme Court review of any
judgment that appears to apply that standard improperly. But there is
another, more readily available, source of protection against local
prejudice. It is almost certain that these cases will fall within the ambit
of diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. The amount involved
ordinarily will be over the jurisdictional minimum and, by hypothesis,
the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state and the defendant is a
foreign corporation or an individual citizen and resident of another
state. If the danger of prejudice from a local trial is serious, the dis-
trict court has the statutory power to transfer the cause to any other
district where the action might have originally been brought.1 88 The
utilization of this section will avoid hardship of dismissal, with attendant
problems of the statute of limitations, will avoid engrafting peculiar
exceptions on the jurisdictional rules and will place the solution where
it properly belongs-in the discretionary power of a court to transfer
a cause "in the interest of justice."
186. See Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 1967).
187. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964) provides in part: "For the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
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IV. Contract Cases
The preceding pages of this essay have focused primarily on the
probable application of section 410.10 in tort cases of various sorts;
products liability cases have claimed by far the greatest share of atten-
tion. Such an imbalanced treatment-as it may seem at first-is be-
lieved to be justified on the ground that products liability is the one
class of cases where borderline questions as to the extent of California's
long-arm jurisdiction are most likely to arise, and where an expanded
jurisdiction over nonresidents is most imperatively necessary if impor-
tant principles of substantive law are to be fully effective. But however
important the tort cases may be, any forecast of the probable ramifica-
tions of section 410.10 would be incomplete without at least a brief con-
sideration of the ways in which the new statute may extend California's
long-arm jurisdiction in the other major category of civil litigation-the
contract cases.
A. Fundamental Principles
For purposes of determining which "contractual contacts" justify
long-arm jurisdiction, the leading post-International Shoe case is McGee
v. International Life Insurance Co.189 The defendant was a Texas life
insurance company-not qualified to do business in California-which
reinsured the life of a California resident. The only activities linking
the insurance company with California were those undertaken pursuant
to this one insurance policy: The company mailed a certificate of in-
surance to the insured in California; the insured mailed premium pay-
ments from California to the company in Texas. The company main-
tained no office or agents in California, and it is doubtful whether the
company was doing sufficient business in California so that it could
be regarded as "present" in California under the fictions which were
utilized of necessity prior to International Shoe.'"0 The Supreme Court
in McGee enunciated the fundamental principle that "[i]t is sufficient
for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which
had substantial connection with that State,"'' and upheld California's
189. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
190. For an analysis of the old concept of "corporate presence" as a basis of
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, see Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due
Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to
Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 580-84 (1958); The Development of
In Personam Jurisdiction over Individuals and Corporations in California: 1849-1970,
21 HASTINGS L.J. , - (1970).
191. 355 U.S. at 223.
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power to exercise its "long-anm" jurisdiction under a 1949 statute'92
subjecting foreign corporations to suit in California based on insurance
contracts with California residents.
Among the contacts with California which the Court found suffi-
cient to support jurisdiction were the following:
(a) The contract was delivered in California.
(b) The premiums were mailed from California.
(c) The insured was a resident of California.
(d) California has a manifest interest in providing an effective
means of collection of insurance policies insuring its residents--espe-
cially when claims are so small in amount as to make it scarcely worth-
while for a plaintiff to try to collect by suing in a distant state. 193 The
fact that the California statute went into effect in 1949-after the con-
tract had been executed-was held not to bar its applicability in this
particular case.'94
McGee is the only Supreme Court case to date in which contacts
incident to a single contract'95 were adjudged sufficient as a basis of
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. It might be argued that
McGee is not a typical contract case since the subject matter was an in-
surance policy, which a state has an unusually strong interest in regu-
lating. The Supreme Court's language was general, however, and not
limited to insurance contracts. Moreover, the "manifest state interest"
was only one of several factors identified as supporting the California
court's jurisdiction.196
In searching for the outer boundaries of judicial jurisdiction, cases
denying jurisdiction are more significant than cases granting jurisdic-
diction. Since the International Shoe rule that requires sufficient con-
tacts does not afford any precise measuring stick, a recent Supreme
192. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-20.
193. 355 U.S. at 223.
194. Id. at 224.
195. The Court in McGee stated that "so far as the record before us shows, re-
spondent has never solicited or done any insurance business in California apart from
the policy involved here." Id. at 222.
196. See text accompanying notes 192-93 supra. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF
CoNFmics § 36, comment e at 190-91: "[A] state may exercise judicial jurisdiction
over a foreign insurer which negotiates a single insurance contract in the state as to
causes of action arising from this contract [citing McGee]. It is likewise reasonable
that a state should exercise judicial jurisdiction over a non-resident individual as to
causes of action arising from an act done, or caused to be done, by him in the state for
pecuniary profit and having substantial consequences there even though the act is an
isolated act not constituting the doing of business in the state."
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Court case such as McGee can only tell us what combination of con-
tacts is regarded as sufficient, but it cannot tell us what combination of
contacts is insufficient. The facts in Hanson v. Denckla,197 it will
be recalled, 198 include execution of a trust in Delaware by a Pennsyl-
vania resident, nominating a Delaware bank as the trustee. At a later
time, the trustor became a Florida resident and exercised, in Florida,
her power of appointment which had the effect of adding a portion of
the first trust to two other trusts in which a Delaware resident was
trustee. An action was brought in Florida concerning the exercise of
the power of appointment, and the court's ability to reach defend-
ants, including the Delaware trustee, by service outside of Florida
was in question. The Supreme Court did not regard the later domicile
of the trustor in Florida and her exercise of the power of appoint-
ment there as being significant in determining whether the Florida court
could obtain jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee. The Court stated
that "there must be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."' 9
Analyzing the facts of Hanson in terms of ordinary contractual
activity, we find the following elements were absent or present:
1. Trustor, one of the parties to the trust "contract," was not a
resident of Florida at the time of execution of the trust.
2. Trustee, the other party to the trust "contract," (considering
for purpose of our analysis that a trust instrument which is accepted
by a trustee is the legal equivalent to an ordinary contract), was never
a Florida resident, and engaged in no activity there.
3. The trust contract was partly performed in Florida, but the
trustee did not know and could not reasonably have contemplated that
this would occur at the time it accepted the trust.
4. Trustor later became a Florida resident, but the trustee could
not reasonably have contemplated this eventuality at the time the trust
was created.
Contrast this with McGee, where the insurance company either knew or
could reasonably have contemplated that upon the death of the insured
the beneficiaries would be California residents who would logically be
expected to sue in California on an unpaid claim.
197. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
198. See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra.
199. 357 U.S. at 253. For a criticism of this decision, see Phillips v. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 256-59, 413 P.2d 732, 735-37 (1966).
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The fundamental Supreme Court cases yield the following general
formula for deciding questions of a state's extraterritorial jurisdiction in
contract actions: The minimum contacts requirement of International
Shoe is satisfied (1) if the contract in suit has a "substantial connection"
with the forum state (McGee), and (2) if the substantial connection
was "purposeful" from the defendant's standpoint-that is, if the de-
fendant could reasonably have foreseen the connection when the con-
tract was made (Hanson). But this general formula is only a starting
point. In order to resolve practical problems arising under section
410.10, practitioners need a concrete notion of the specific contractual
activities which, when purposefully conducted in the forum state, will
suffice to constitute the requisite connection. For present purposes,
every ordinary contract may be roughly analyzed as involving three
differentiable activities: Preliminary negotiation, formation and per-
formance. Thus the essential issue to be resolved in this subsection
may be stated as follows: In the case of any contract, which of the con-
stitutent contractual activities must take place in California in order to
satisfy the McGee-Hanson requirement of purposeful and substantial
connection with the forum, and hence enable a California plaintiff to
obtain jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant in an action arising
out of the contract? Particularly illuminating on this issue are certain
decisions from other states-states that have long-arm statutes expressly
conferring personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in contract
actions where the contract in suit is "made" or is "to be performed" with-
in the forum state.
B. Specific Factors
(1) Preliminary Negotiations
When preliminary negotiations are the sole connection between
the defendant and the forum state, and when the contract is made and
is to be performed outside the forum state, there is probably no suffi-
cient basis of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in an action
arising out of the contract."' 0 The Maryland court so held in Panameri-
can Consulting Co. v. Corbu Industrial, S.A., 201 a case decided in
200. "The extent of the defendant's relationship to the state is material. This is so
because of considerations of fairness to the defendant. For the more closely the de-
fendant is related to the state, the more convenient it will probably be for him to stand
suit there. . . . [Tihe more closely the defendant is related to the state, the greater is
the interest of the state in him and consequently the more appropriate it will be that
the state should be in a position to try the case against the defendant in its courts
... ." SEcoND RFSTATE MENT OF CONFLICTS § 36, comment e at 191.
201. 219 Md. 478, 150 A.2d 250 (1959).
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1959. Although some preliminary negotiations between the plaintiff,
a Maryland corporation, and the defendant Mexican corporation had
taken place in Maryland, the contract had been formally accepted in
Mexico. The court's decision denying jurisdiction over the defendant
may have been compelled by the terms of Maryland's long-arm statute,
which conferred jurisdiction over foreign corporations sued by Mary-
land residents on contracts "made" within the state;20 2 the court con-
strued this to mean that the statute would not apply unless the acceptance
had taken place in Maryland. It is not unlikely, however, that such a
construction was adopted in order to obviate constitutional difficulties
that might have arisen had the court tried to base jurisdiction on mere
preliminary negotiations, without anything more in the way of a "sub-
stantial connection."
(2) Making of a Contract within the State
A contract is "made," in legal contemplation, in the state where
the last act necessary to create a binding obligation is performed.2 °3
This means in essence that a contract is made in whichever state the
acceptance occurs. Accordingly, the question that presents itself at this
juncture is whether, under section 410.10, the mere "making" or ac-
ceptance of a contract in California will be sufficient to support juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant in an action arising out of the con-
tract. Several states have enacted long-arm statutes expressly conferring
jurisdiction in contract actions where the sole "connection" (to use the
McGee terminology) between the contract in suit and the forum state
is the making of the contract there.20 4 Never has the constitutionality
of such statutes been successfully challenged.20 5 It should be noted,
nevertheless, that in most of the cases where long-arm jurisdiction has
been predicated solely on the making of a contract within the forum,
the making of the contract was not in fact the defendant's sole con-
tact with the forum.20 6 For example, in Compania de Astral, S.A. v.
202. Ch. 504, § 118(d), [19371 Md. Laws (formerly Md. Code Ann. art. 23,
§ 92(d) (1957)).
203. E.g., Ericksson v. Cartan Travel Bureau, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 315 (D. Md.
1953).
204. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411 (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-145 (1953).
205. Cases in which constitutional assaults have been fruitless are collected in By-
ham v. National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 58, 143 S.E.2d 225, 232 (1965).
206. E.g., Kokomo Opalescent Glass Co. v. Arthur W. Schmid Int'l, Inc., 371
F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1966); National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d
472 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 959 (1959); Michael Schiavone & Sons v. Gal-
land-Henning Mfg. Co., 263 F. Supp. 261 (D. Conn. 1967); Electronic Mfg. Corp. v.
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Boston Metals Co.,207 another Maryland case, it was determined that the
contract in suit had been "made" or accepted in Maryland, and that
jurisdiction over the Panamanian defendant could properly be obtained.
But the court carefully emphasized partial performance of the con-
tract was also to take place in Maryland 208-- and this despite the fact
that the applicable Maryland long-arm statute says nothing about per-
formance.
In view of the absence of any case in which long-arm jurisdiction
was predicated solely on acceptance of a contract within the state, a con-
servative forecast as to the operation of section 410.10 in such a situa-
tion should run something like this: If the sole connection between the
contract in suit and the state of California is the fact'that it was accepted
there, then jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant may well prove
unobtainable; 20 9 but if in addition to the acceptance in California, some
part-however slight-of either party's performance was to be under-
taken there, then the exercise of jurisdiction will probably be upheld.
210
(3) Performance within the State
The cases leave little room for doubt that when the contract in suit
is to be performed wholly or in part by either party within the forum
state, the requisite substantial connection exists and long-arm jurisdic-
tion over an absent defendant may properly be assumed.21' The only
apparent qualification to this broad statement is the one imposed by
Hanson: The defendant must have been able to foresee, at the time
the contract was executed, that performance would take place within
the state.
The leading case in the contracts field lends some support to this
proposition. In McGee, both the plaintiff's performance-mailing
Trion, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ind. 1962); Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 111.
App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962); Esser v. Cantor, 55 Misc. 2d 235, 284 N.Y.S.2d
914 (New York City Civ. Ct.), affd, 55 Misc. 2d 720, 286 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 1967).
207. 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
208. Id. at 261, 107 A.2d at 367-68.
209. See SECOND REsTrATEmENT OF CoNDUcis § 36, comment e at 193: "While in
state X where both are domiciled, A and B negotiate the terms of a contract which
is to be performed in X. The contract is drawn up in X and B signs it there. A, how-
ever, is too hurried to sign the contract at that time. He signs it in State Y and from
there mails it back to B in X. On these facts alone, Y may not exercise judicial
jurisdiction over A as to causes of action arising from the contract."
210. See SEcOND RESTATEMENT OF CoNrLicTs § 36, comment e at 193, Illustra-
tion 3.
211. See cases cited note 206 supra.
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premium payments-and the defendant's performance-paying the
beneficiary upon the death of the policyholder-were to take place in
California. There were, of course, additional connections with Cali-
fornia: Some preliminary negotiations occurred here, the contract was
accepted here, and-as the Court emphasized-California had a special
interest in facilitating suits by residents against out-of-state insurers.
The fact that both parties' performance was to be undertaken in Cali-
fornia doubtless carried great weight, however, and may well have
sufficed in itself to support California's exercise of long-arm jurisdic-
tion. California's "manifest interest" would have been much less sub-
stantial if the contract were to have been performed elsewhere.
21 2
The notion that mere performance of a contract in the forum state
constitutes the requisite substantial connection is considerably reinforced
by a recent North Carolina case, Byham v. National Cibo House
Corp.2"3 This was a suit brought against a Tennessee franchisor by a
North Carolina franchisee who sought to rescind the franchise agree-
ment and recover damages for the franchisor's alleged fraud. The
applicable North Carolina long-arm statute subjected foreign corpora-
tions to the state's jurisdiction in any action arising out of a contract
made or to be performed in North Carolina.214 The contract involved
in Byham had not been "made" in North Carolina; technically, it was
accepted by the defendant in Tennessee. Nevertheless, jurisdiction of
the North Carolina court was upheld on the ground that the contract
was to be performed in that state.
The foregoing analysis of contractual contacts may appear overly
mechanical and academic. Most of the reported decisions bear witness
that as a practical matter, a contracts case will seldom arise where
either preliminary negotiations, acceptance, or performance is the only
substantial and purposeful connection with the forum state.21 '  In the
overwhelming majority of cases, more than one-and very likely all
three-of these factors will be present. In many cases, there will be
some basis other than the isolated contractual contact, such as status,
"presence," etc., upon which long-arm jurisdiction can be based. In
all of these situations, if they occur in California, jurisdiction over an
absent defendant will almost certainly be obtainable under new sec-
tion 410.10.
212. See note 200 supra.
213. 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1953).
215. See, e.g., Panamerican Consulting Co. v. Corbu Industrial, S.A., 219 Md. 478,
150 A.2d 250 (1959); Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237,
107 A.2d 357, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
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Conclusion
As stated at the outset, the overriding purpose of this essay has
been to seek practical guidelines for the interpretation of California's
new long-arm statute and to predict its probable application in various
types of concrete cases. Such an enterprise is surely a necessary one;
but in a certain sense, it can never be completed and will always fall
short of perfection-if perfection be defined as a minutely detailed
and permanently valid classification of all factual situations in which
a state's exercise of jurisdiction over an absent defendant may be sus-
tained. The mandate of section 410.10 is in terms coextensive with
the mandate of constitutional due process, and due process issues are
not susceptible of any such precise and definitive resolution. New de-
velopments in society at large will cause jurisdictional issues to be pre-
sented in the context of new and unforeseen factual situations. These
in turn will call for innovative interpretations of the due process limits.
As Mr. Justice Black observed in McGee:
Looking back over this long history of litigation [from Pen-
noyer through International Shoe] a trend is clearly discernible
toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over
foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is at-
tributable to the fundamental transformation of our national econ-
omy over the years. . . . With [the] increasing nationalization of
commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modem
transportation and communication have made it much less burden-
some for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages
in economic activity.21
6
California courts, in their past decisions, have recognized that the
"fundamental transformation" here referred to is a continuing process,
and that the concomitant expansion of the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction should continue at an equal pace. They have therefore
demonstrated a willingness to place a broad and liberal construction
upon the various long-arm provisions in effect prior to the enactment of
section 410.10. The leading example is Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Su-
perior Court,21 7 in which the supreme court interpreted the "doing
business" provisions of old section 411 to require only that a foreign
corporate defendant have minimum contacts with the state. The courts,
henceforth unhindered by statutory restrictions, will doubtless continue
this process of liberal construction when they begin to apply section
410.10.
216. 355 U.S. at 222-23.
217. 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 438 (1958).
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